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A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE "WAR ON
DRUGS": COMPARING THE CONSEQUENCES




While the Bush Administration continues to fight the war on
terrorism abroad, a long-waged battle continues at home as fervently
as ever.' Rather than diverting resources and attention away from
* J.D., 2002, University of Southern California Law School; B.S., 1999,
Northwestern University. Thanks to Linda Beres, Mary Dudziak, and Thomas
Griffith; without their help this piece would not have come into being. My
most special thanks to Graham Smith, for everything.
1. There is evidence of President George W. Bush's continued
commitment to the drug war. See, e.g., Attorney General John Ashcroft,
Prepared Remarks at the Operation Trifecta Announcement (July 31, 2003)
(announcing the conclusion of Operation Trifecta, "a 19-month multi-national
Organized Crime, Drug Enforcement Task Force investigation .... The
American public should know that the[] tools that have allowed us to make
gains in our war on drugs, are the same tools that allow us to make gains in our
war on terrorism .... Just as in the war on terrorism, the war on drugs is truly
a fight between those who love freedom and respect the rule of law and those
who seek to enslave and to corrupt [the rule of law]."), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2003/073103tripressfinallarge.htm;
National Drug Control Strategy, Office of National Drug Control Policy (Feb.
2002) ("Illegal drug use threatens everything that is good about our
country .... Internationally, it finances the work of terrorists who use drug
profits to fund their murderous work. Our fight against illegal drug use is a fight
for our children's future, for struggling democracies, and against terrorism."),
available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/03ndcs/
pages l30.pdf ; Bush Seeks a 25% Drop in Drug Abuse, DESERET NEWS (Salt
Lake City), Feb. 13, 2002, at A03 (discussing the anti-drug advertising campaign
the White House launched during the Super Bowl 2002, which suggests "that
money used to buy drugs may benefit terrorists"), available at LEXIS, News
Library, Deseret News File, 2002 WL 11576063 ; James Gerstenzang, Bush Sets
Goals for Major Cuts in Drug Use, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002, at A28 ("Citing
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the support he said terrorist networks get from selling drugs, whether in South
America or Afghanistan, Bush said: 'When people purchase drugs, they put
money in the hands of those who want to hurt America, hurt our allies."');
President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on the 2002 National Drug
Control Strategy at the East Room, Office of National Drug Policy (Feb. 12,
2002) ("One big challenge.., is to defend freedom, is to remain united as we
fight for the very values that we hold so dear. [A]nother big challenge is to
battle drug use .... [Drugs] destroy the souls of our children. And the
drug trade supports terrorist networks .... When we fight drugs, we
fight the war on terror."), at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
news/speech02/021202/strategyremarks.pdf ; Dana Milbank & Cheryl W.
Thompson, Bush Seeks Cut in Drug Use; Aides Say Plan Stresses Treatment
Rather than Enforcement, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2002, at A10 (quoting President
Bush: "Drugs help supply the deadly work of terrorists .... Make no mistake
about it: If you're buying illegal drugs in America, it is likely that money is
going to end up in the hands of terrorist organizations."), available at LEXIS,
News Library, Wash. Post File, 2002 WL 13817192; Bill Straub, Administration
Unveils New Anti-Drug Program, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, June 26,
2003 (discussing the "25-Cities Initiative," in which the federal government will
work together with local officials in twenty-five of the largest U.S. cities so that
"all drug-fighting units work in concert" and noting that the federal government
invested 11.2 billion dollars in the war on drugs in 2003 and that President Bush,
despite the budget deficit, seeks to add 440 million dollars to the total drug war
effort), available at LEXIS, News Library, Scripps Howard News Service File;
Jacob Sullum, When Holding a Party is a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2003, at
A27 (discussing the passage of the Reducing Americans' Vulnerability to
Ecstasy or RAVE Bill in April 2003), available at LEXIS, News Library, N.Y.
Times File, 2003 WL 56604591 ; Patrick Timmons, Bush Official Visits Texas to
Discuss War on Drugs, U. WIRE (U. Texas-Austin), June 27, 2002, available at
LEXIS, News Library, University Wire File; Will Weissert, U.S. Drug Czar
Says Homeland Security Department Will Revitalize the Drug War, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 5, 2002 (detailing the nexus between the drug trade and
international terrorism, according to President Bush and Commissioner of
Narcotics John P. Walters). President Bush is not the first President to tie the
war on drugs to concerns about national security. During his tenure, President
Ronald Regan endorsed a National Security Decision Directive, which
categorized drug traffickers as a national security threat and authorized the use
of the national security regime to combat drug trafficking. Eric E. Sterling,
The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and Reform, 40 VILL.
L. REV. 383, 397 (1995). As both "wars" continue, the international military
offensive against terror may continue to influence domestic "drug war"
policies. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE
IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 204, 237 (2000) (discussing the nexus
between the Vietnam War and domestic "wars" against poverty, misery,
disease, and ignorance and President Lyndon Johnson's characterization of the
Voting Rights Act "in the rhetoric of militarism"); MICHAEL S. SHERRY, IN
THE SHADOW OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE 1930S (1995)
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the "war on drugs," the war on terror has renewed interest in U.S.
domestic drug policies.2 The White House has promoted the most
recent National Drug Control Strategy as a compassionate approach,
focused on treatment and prevention rather than enforcement.3
Critics charge, however, that notwithstanding "the shiny new
wrapping paper, this is the same old failed and racially biased drug
policy.
'A
Illicit drug use presents a difficult problem with many
competing aims. Effective strategies should guard against the
societal harms associated with drug culture, promote the prevention
of drug dependence, and assist current users in overcoming their
addiction to lead productive lives. By some accounts, the existing
federal drug sentencing scheme fails to achieve these objectives and
has proven unsuccessful. Federal sentencing laws arguably
communicate prohibitionist goals, 5 though they operate in a climate of
persistent drug addiction.6 Some scholars charge that mandatory
(connecting U.S. "war" efforts abroad to changes in domestic policies, culture,
politics, and art).
2. See supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Bush Seeks a 25% Drop in Drug Abuse, supra note 1, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Deseret News File; 2002 WL 11576063 (reporting that
the new policy would use "arnies of compassion" via faith-based organizations
to communicate to drug addicts that "[w]e love you. We love you so much
we're going to convince you not to use drugs in the future."); Gerstenzang, supra
note I (quoting President Bush: "We're determined... to provide addicts with
effective and compassionate drug treatment"); Hemmer, supra note 1 (quoting
President Bush: "We must aggressively promote drug treatment. Because a
nation that is tough on drugs must also be compassionate to those addicted to
drugs."). This approach recalls President Bush's campaign, in which he termed
himself a "compassionate conservative." See Dan Balz, Bush Claims GOP
Nomination; Change in "Tone of Washington" is Vowed; Reforms and Tax Cuts
Pledged, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2000, at AO1, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Wash. Post File, 2000 WL 19622564.
4. Milbank & Thompson, supra note 1 (quoting Rep. John Conyers, Jr.
(D-Mich.)); see also Bush Seeks a 25% Drop in Drug Abuse, supra note 1,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Deseret News File; 2002 WL 11576063
(quoting William McColl of the Drug Policy Alliance: "It's drug war on
autopilot. It's not anything any different than what we've seen.").
5. See EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL
9 (1996); JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT
WE CAN Do ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 7, 9,
125, 151-63, 167, 183, 222 (2001) (categorizing U.S. federal drug policy as a
"zero-tolerance" approach).
6. See infra Part V.C.
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minimum sentencing and sentencing guidelines have contributed to
alarming incarceration rates 7 with a disproportionate impact on drug
offenders comprising racial and ethnic minorities.8  Without
comprehensive reform, the existing federal sentencing scheme
7. As they currently exist, federal sentencing schemes continue to result in
the imprisonment of non-violent drug offenders at a higher rate and for longer
prison terms than many violent offenders. GRAY, supra note 5, at 36
(criticizing federal laws and prison overcrowding, a situation that requires
wardens to release violent offenders so that nonviolent drug offenders may
serve their full sentences according to federal statutory mandate); Deborah
Small, The War on Drugs is a War on Racial Justice, 68 Soc. REs. 896, 898
(alleging that our current drug policies "provide economic incentives for rural
communities to embrace prisons as a form of economic development"); Allen
J. Beck & Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners in 2000, Bureau of Justice Statistics
(tbl. 19, detailing number of sentenced inmates in federal prisons by
most serious offense, 1990, 1995, 1999), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/p00.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003). [hereinafter Prisoners in 2000].
8. As a consequence of federal sentencing legislation for drug offenses, a
disproportionate number of young black men are currently imprisoned, many
of them for drug offenses, and many of them now disenfranchised. See Small,
supra note 7, at 897 (reporting that one of every three black men in his
twenties is subject to criminal justice control and that while black people are
only thirteen percent of all drug users, they comprise thirty-five percent of all
people arrested for illegal drug possession, fifty-five percent of persons
convicted, and seventy-four percent of all people sent to prison); The
Expanding Federal Prison Population, The Sentencing Project (contending
that more than two-thirds of federal prisoners are racial or ethnic minorities
and that the percentage of felony drug prisoners has risen by approximately
thirty-five percent in the last two decades), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1068.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).;
Facts About Prisons and Prisoners, The Sentencing Project (citing that one in
eight young black men and one in twenty-three Hispanic men between the ages
of twenty-five and twenty-nine were imprisoned in mid-2002, as compared to
one in sixty-three white males in the same age group; asserting that forty-five
percent of prison inmates were black and eighteen percent were Hispanic in
2002; and providing the startling statistic that black men face a thirty-two
percent chance of being imprisoned at some time in their lives, while Hispanic
males have a seventeen percent chance of the same occurrence,
and white males face only a six percent chance of serving time
in prison during their lifetimes), available at http://www.
sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1035.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003); see also infra
Part V.B. Accordingly, Small notes that disenfranchisement of convicted
felons have "politically marginalized" communities of color. Small, supra,
note 7, at 898. For a brief summary of felony disenfranchisement
laws nationwide, see Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the
United States, The Sentencing Project, at http://www.sentencingproject.org/
pdfs/1 046.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
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deemphasizes hopes of approaching drug abuse also as a health and
social crisis, rather than an exclusively criminal problem that
additional incarceration will solve.
9
Many scholars have approached the "drug war" from a rights-
based perspective; they have critiqued federal drug sentencing statutes,
particularly those imposing longer sentences on "crack" cocaine as
compared to powder cocaine violations because of the resulting
lopsided impact on racial minorities. 10 The Supreme Court has
rejected various rights-based arguments, upholding questionable
sentencing schemes." With little hope for reform situated in such a
9. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 5, at 28-46. Mandatory minimums
emphasize incarceration to the exclusion of reducing drug addiction to an
appreciable degree, decreasing the frequency and amount of the drugs that
addicts use, and abating the spread of disease. See Melody M. Heaps & James
A. Swartz, Toward a Rational Drug Policy: Setting New Priorities, 1994 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 175, 190-93 (1994).
10. For a discussion of the crack-cocaine sentencing disparity in mandatory
minimum legislation, see, for example, DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE:
RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 141-46
(1999); Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: "De-Coding" Colorblind Slurs
During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611,
613 (2000); Doris Marie Provine, Symposium, Too Many Black Men: The
Sentencing Judge's Dilemma, 23 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 823, 837 (1998);
Andrew N. Sacher, Inequities of the Drug War: Legislative Discrimination on
the Cocaine Battlefield, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1149, 1154 (1997); David
Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283,
1287-90 (1995); Laura A. Wytsma, Punishment for "Just Us"--A
Constitutional Analysis of the Crack Cocaine Sentencing Statutes, 3 GEO.
MASON INDEP. L. REV. 473, 474 (1995). For a discussion of the crack-cocaine
sentencing disparity in sentencing guidelines, see, e.g., Matthew F. Leitman, A
Proposed Standard of Equal Protection Review for Classifications Within the
Criminal Justice System that Have a Racially Disparate Impact: A Case Study
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Classification Between Crack and
Powder Cocaine, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 215 (1994).
11. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual provision contains a proportionality
principle only for capital cases but not for prison sentences and consequently
upholding a mandatory life imprisonment term without the possibility of parole
for cocaine possession); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)
(upholding sentencing guidelines as constitutional); see also infra note 50
(discussing Harmelin in more detail). But see United States v. Armstrong, 517
U.S. 456, 478-80 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the "regime
of extremely high penalties for the possession and distribution of so-called
'crack' cocaine" in mandatory minimum legislation and sentencing guidelines
as well as the disproportionate impact such laws have had on blacks).
984 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:979
rights-based context, federal sentencing critics might employ an
alternative framework. Considering the consequences of federal
drug sentencing laws presents a viable option for critically assessing
existing federal sentencing policies. To facilitate this consequentialist
analysis, Part II reviews the historical underpinnings of federal
mandatory minimums to help explain the development of federal drug
control laws into contemporary mandatory minimum legislation and
sentencing guidelines. This section then details existing federal
sentencing laws.
Once armed with knowledge about the workings of federal drug
sentencing, looking beyond the U.S. system provides one helpful
way to evaluate American policies and their consequences. Part III
investigates England's drug control legislation, including sentencing
for drug offenses. While no panacea for the drug problem inheres in
the British system, comparing both sentencing approaches uncovers
worthwhile ideas and techniques for addressing drug addiction and
its attendant harms, as the countries share similar values and political
systems. With the parameters of each legal system outlined, Part IV
compares the legislation of each system, while Part V evaluates some
of the consequences of sentencing practices for drug offenses in both
countries, arguing that the United States might benefit from looking
critically at the English system.
Revising federal drug sentencing policy presents no small task.
As such, this Article does not promote a radical approach, such as
legalization, as the appropriate alternative for effectively reorienting
the "drug war."' 12 Instead, it seeks to rejuvenate the discussion about
the problems federal sentencing practices have bred by adding a
comparative consequentialist angle. Part VI concludes that U.S.
legislators might learn from comparing our sentencing scheme to the
British experience in particular, and more generally, that engaging in
a comparative consequentialist enterprise puts forth an innovative
method for considering some of the troubling aspects of federal drug
sentencing laws in the United States.
12. But see, e.g., Jeffrey A. Miron & Jeffrey Zwiebel, The Economic Case
Against Drug Prohibition, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Autumn 1995, 175, 176
(1995) (using an economic perspective to argue for legalization of drugs).
"The bottom line is that a relatively free market in drugs is likely to be vastly
superior to the current policy of prohibition." Id. at 176.
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II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL
Federal mandatory minimum sentences' 3 and sentencing
guidelines based upon them 14 have dramatically increased the
incarceration rate in the United States and have resulted in a
disproportionate rise in the imprisonment of drug offenders as
compared to violent offenders.' 5  These pieces of sentencing
legislation grew out of an extensive trajectory, beginning with non-
control of illicit drugs at the federal level. A brief review of the
origin of the American "drug war" places mandatory minimums and
sentencing guidelines in a broader social and historical context that
will help to evaluate the consequences of the existing U.S. federal
sentencing scheme and to facilitate a comparison to English
sentencing policies.
A. The Beginnings of Drug Control in the United States
From the late eighteenth century until the early twentieth
century, the U.S. federal government did not criminalize the sale,
manufacture, possession, or use of substances defined as illicit
today. 16 Without federal legal controls or penal sanctions in place,
medicine became one of the main vehicles through which Americans
addressed drug use. 17 The lack of legal proscriptions on illicit drugs
and medical ignorance as to the dangerous and addictive character of
many narcotics, including morphine and cocaine, led to a notable
drug addiction problem.'8 In 1906, Congress brought regulation of
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2001).
14. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-99 (1984) (creating United States Sentencing
Commission); 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1984) (detailing factors to consider in
imposing a sentence); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D 1.1 (2000)
(Commission sentencing guidelines for drug manufacture, import, export); id.
§ 2D2.1 (U.S. Sentencing Commission guidelines for drug possession); id. app.
(sentencing table used to determine guideline ranges).
15. See, e.g., Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The
Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 365-66 (1995) (arguing against
the myopic emphasis on incarceration as the only remedy to contend with drug
addiction and drug-related crime). See also infra Part V.A.
16. Sterling, supra note 1, at 391-92.
17. JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG
COURT MOVEMENT 17 (2001).
18. See BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 62-63; NOLAN, supra note 17, at
17; Sterling, supra note 1, at 392; see also GRAY, supra note 5, at 21. Gray
notes that the generous use of narcotics to ease pain during the Civil War may
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 37:979
such drugs to the federal level with the Pure Food and Drug Act. 19
Additionally, anti-drug activists and missionaries pushed for stricter
regulation of narcotics, specifically opium, in the early twentieth
century.
20
have promoted addiction among soldiers, or "soldier's disease." Id. The
inclusion of narcotics in widely available patent medicines, which were over-
the-counter elixirs or snake oils used to self-medicate, also contributed to drug
addiction. Id.; Sterling, supra note 1, at 392. The non-regulation of patent
medicines allowed Coca-Cola to contain cocaine for several years at the end of
the nineteenth century and Bayer Pharmaceuticals to sell heroin over the
counter before introducing aspirin in 1899. GRAY, supra note 5, at 21; see also
BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 61 (discussing unregulated patent medicines,
including cigars, hypodermic injections, ointment, and morphine sold through
the Sears Roebuck catalogue).
By the beginning of the twentieth century, about 250,000 people
suffered from addiction to illicit substances. Sterling, supra note 1, at 392.
This diverse group included people of all races and classes, id., but had a
disproportionate number of Civil War soldiers and agrarian housewives.
GRAY, supra note 5, at 21. Despite the prevalence of drug addiction among
various populations, the public perceived drug users as people of color,
including black Americans and Mexican and Chinese immigrants. Sterling,
supra note 1, at 392; see GRAY, supra note 5, at 20-21; NOLAN, supra note 17,
at 22. In the Southern United States, whites identified blacks with cocaine
addiction. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 64; NOLAN, supra note 17, at 24-
25; Sterling, supra note 1, at 392. Long-held racial intolerance and animosity,
and ethnic stereotypes generated fear that black drug addicts would "attack
white society" and that cocaine engendered Herculean qualities in blacks,
making them legendarily invincible. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 64;
Sterling, supra note 1, at 392. The American public similarly stigmatized
Chinese immigrants, who were linked to opium smoking. BERTRAM ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 64; Sterling, supra note 1, at 392. In fact, the Chinese were
credited with attempting to "spread" the practice of opium smoking in an
"effort to undermine American society." Sterling, supra note 1, at 392; see
also BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 61-62. ("A small percentage of
addicts--especially those who were black (in the South) or Chinese (in the
West)-were considered social pariahs and were feared."). It was widely
believed that drug use led to criminality, immorality, and death and that drug
addiction threatened "America's moral superiority and progress." BERTRAM ET
AL., supra note 5, at 64. These ideas and deep prejudices against minorities
promoted racist anti-drug laws at the state and local level and contributed to
some legislation at the federal level. Id.
19. 34 Stat. 768 (1906). This legislation required detailed labeling of all
narcotic ingredients. Id.
20. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 66; NOLAN, supra note 17, at 20-21.
Concerns about opium use began just after the United States occupied the
Philippines in 1898, when missionaries discovered rampant opium addiction
among the Filipino people. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 65; NOLAN,
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Since then federal drug policies have continued to move away
from a medical model and have become more oriented toward penal
controls. During the 1930s, the federal government began to build
the groundwork of the anti-drug criminal apparatus that exists
today.2 ' Congress established the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
("FBN") within the Treasury Department,22 and President Hoover
appointed Harry Anslinger as the first Commissioner of Narcotics,
more popularly known as the "Drug Czar."23 Anslinger supported
the Marijuana Tax Act, passed in 1937, which taxed the medicinal
use of marijuana and outlawed possession or sale of the drug for any
other purpose.
24
supra note 17, at 20. The Harrison Act, which followed, had three aims:
directing producers, distributors and purchasers of narcotics to register with the
federal government; imposing a tax on registered parties on the sale or
purchase of illicit substances; and limiting the legitimate dispensing of drugs to
physician prescriptions issued "in good faith" and "in the course of [a doctor's]
professional practice." BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 68; NOLAN, supra
note 17, at 27. See also 63d Cong., CONG. REC. 3rd Sess., Chap. 1 (Public Act
No. 223), 785-90.
The Supreme Court initially resisted understanding the largely
administrative Harrison Act as authorizing the arrest of doctors for maintaining
addicts or of addicts for illegal possession of drugs. United States v. Jin Fuey
Moy, 241 U.S. 402 (1916); see also BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 69;
NOLAN, supra note 17, at 28 (discussing the Jin Fuey Moy case). Eventually,
however, the Court relented, ruling that physicians could not legally prescribe
drugs to maintain addicts because such a custom was not legitimately within
the course of professional practice. Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 99-
100 (1919). ("[T]o call such an order for the use of morphine a physician's
prescription would be so plain a perversion of meaning that no discussion of
the subject is required. That question should be answered in the negative.").
21. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 78.
22. Id. at 79; NOLAN, supra note 17, at 32. One charge of the FBN was to
oversee narcotics farms with help from the Department of Justice. NOLAN,
supra note 17, at 32. Although these farms were originally intended to provide
treatment to addicts who were now unable to procure maintenance drugs via
medical prescriptions, "they ended up being nothing more than glorified
prisons for drug addicts." Id.; see also BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 77
(asserting that one of the two narcotics farms was eventually transformed into
a treatment facility when steel bars were removed from cells in the 1960s).
23. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 79; NOLAN, supra note 17, at 32-33.
24. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 81. Deliberately inflated taxes on
medical marijuana (approximately $100 per pound, while actually costing only
$2.00 per pound) eliminated the use of marijuana in the medical context. Id.
Anslinger also promoted the belief that marijuana caused crime. Id.
Objections of critics, such as Senator Coffee (D-Washington), who suggested
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The conclusion of World War II and the dawn of McCarthyism
made the atmosphere ripe for additional sanctions on drug users and
marked the dawn of the mandatory minimum legislative scheme in
place today.25 According to Nolan, "[d]uring the World War II and
postwar period, federal narcotics laws [continued] to ignore the
medical perspective and [became] even more severe than before.,
26
A 1951 federal law, imposing mandatory minimum sentences on
drug offenders for the first time, reflected this trend away from
medical rhetoric toward "moralism." 27 The Narcotic Control Act of




that taxes on drugs would create a black market and that current FBN policy
denied effective treatment to drug addicts, fell on deaf ears. Id. at 83.
25. Id. at 84.
26. NOLAN, supra note 17, at 34.
27. Boggs Act of 1951, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1952) (repealed by Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 1 101(a)(2), (4), 84 Stat. 1291 (1970)) [hereinafter Boggs Act]. First
time drug possession offenders faced a mandatory two-year minimum
sentence, while second time offenders faced five to ten years, and third time
offenders would have to serve ten to twenty years in prison. Id. The twentieth
century regulation of birth control followed a similar path in which "moral"
undertones supplanted a previously "medical" approach. See, e.g., Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 498-509 (1961) (dismissing on justiciability grounds an
appeal from the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, which held
applicable to married people a statute that proscribed the use of contraceptives,
even in cases where pregnancy posed a severe risk of harm to a married
woman's health and vitality, and prohibited doctors from disseminating
information about birth control to such couples) (decided with Buxton v.
Ullman); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 45-46 (1943) (dismissing for lack
of standing an appeal from the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, which
held applicable to physicians a state statute that prohibited doctors from
prescribing birth control in cases where pregnancy endangered a woman's life
or health and finding that abstinence provides a viable altemative to birth
control for married couples).
28. Narcotics Control Act of 1956, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251 (Supp. IV
1953-1957); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1401-07 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513,
§ 1101(b)(1)(A), 84 Stat. 1292 (1970)) (Supp. IV 1953-1957); 21 U.S.C. §§
174 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1 101(a)(2), (4), 84 Stat. 1291 (1970)),
176a, 176b, 184a (all repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, § I 101(a)(2), (9), 84
Stat. 1291, 1292 (1970)), 198 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, § l101(a)(4),
84 Stat. 1291 (1970)); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4744, 4755, 7237 (repealed by Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 1101(b)(4)(A), 84 Stat. 1292 (1970)) (Supp. IV 1953-1957), 7607
(repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 320(b), 98 Stat. 2056 (1984), Pub. L. No.
98-573, § 213(b)(1), 98 Stat. 2988 (1984), 7608 (Supp. 1953-1957)).
Congress increased the Boggs Act sentence maximums from ten to twenty
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Until Richard Nixon, presidents generally did not involve
themselves actively in drug control policy.29 According to Bertram,
however, President Nixon became the first president to make the
drug problem a "central national-policy concern"--a preeminent
position that the drug war continues to hold more than three decades
later.30 Bertram suggests that during his 1968 presidential campaign
Nixon laid the foundation for the "drug war" by exploiting the
nation's discomfort with "urban riots" and "rising street-crime
rates,' while Reichley points out that Nixon's staff members
prodded Presidential hopeful Nixon to reach out to "black militants"
and unlikely "liberals. 32 Powe argues that through this "law and
order" focus, President Nixon added an unspoken racial element to
his political campaign 33 and successfully politicized the Supreme
Court by voicing his opposition to the expansion of criminal rights
under Chief Justice Warren.34 Once in the White House, Bertram
notes that Nixon steadfastly held to his fixation on the national drug
and crime problem, always insisting they held an inextricable link.35
years for second time offenders and twenty to forty years for third time
offenders. 26 U.S.C. § 7237(a) (1956).
29. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 104.
30. Id.; See also GRAY, supra note 5, at 27 (noting that Nixon was the first
President to declare a war on drugs).
31. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 105; see also MIKE GRAY, DRUG
CRAZY 93-94 (1998) [hereinafter GRAY, DRUG CRAZY] (discussing Nixon's
role in shifting the drug war into "overdrive"); A. JAMES REICHLEY,
CONSERVATIVES IN AN AGE OF CHANGE: THE NIxON AND FORD
ADMINISTRATIONS 54 (1981) (discussing a campaign radio talk in which Nixon
discussed "'the spread of violence and disorder').
32. REICHLEY, supra note 31, at 54.
33. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
475 (2000); GARRY WILLS, NIXON AGONISTES: THE CRISIS OF THE SELF-
MADE MAN 51-52 (1973) ("The desire for 'law and order' is nothing so simple
as a code word for racism; it is a cry, as things begin to break up, for stability,
for stopping history in mid-dissolution."); see also RICHARD REEVES,
PRESIDENT NIXON: ALONE IN THE WHITE HOUSE passim (2001) (noting
various indicators that crime remained at the top of President Nixon's personal
agenda during his presidency). In April 1972, President Nixon indicated that
"[c]rime with particular emphasis on drugs" should be the third major priority
issue for winning the presidential campaign that year. Id. at 467.
34. Id. at 410, 473; WILLS, supra note 33, at 15 (discussing
"[w]hat... Nixon mean[s] when he says some of the courts have weakened the
forces of law").
35. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 105. Notably, Nixon claimed victory
and deescalated the drug war after the 1972 Congressional election. Despite
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Bertram further notes that the President directly communicated his
concerns about drug addiction to the public, to Congress, and to the
media-indelibly denoting drug dealing and drug addiction as
synonymous with crime.36 Nixon also supported the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which merged
various federal anti-drug statutes into one law and established a
schedule of controlled substances.
37
While President Nixon may have been the first President to
bring modern-day national attention to the drug problem, President
Ronald Reagan contributed to the rhetoric. In June 1982, he declared
"war": "We're rejecting the helpless attitude that drug use is so
rampant that we're defenseless to do anything about it. We're taking
down the surrender flag that has flown over so many drug efforts;
we're running up a battle flag. We can fight the drug problem, and
we can win." 38  President Reagan called for total abstinence, a
campaign made famous through the First Lady's "Just Say No"
moving the drug war from the forefront of his domestic policy agenda, the
tools the Nixon administration put in place and the high "drug war" budgetary
allocations remained intact. Id. at 108; see also GRAY, DRUG CRAZY, supra
note 31, at 95 (suggesting that erroneously calculated and astronomically
inflated statistics on the number of drug addicts contributed to the downshift in
the drug war).
36. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 105-06; see GRAY, DRUG CRAZY,
supra note 31, at 94. Some charge that the Nixon White House resorted to
grossly exaggerated drug addiction statistics, claiming that in just two years
(from 1969-1971), the number of heroin abusers grew tenfold. BERTRAM ET
AL., supra note 5, at 106; see GRAY, DRUG CRAZY, supra note 31, at 95
(describing this "fabrication" in detail).
37. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970). This legislation intensified domestic law
enforcement. Id. §§ 951-55, 960-62. In addition to the legislation, Nixon
created the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement when a division of the
Justice Department resisted Nixon's edict to target street-level dealers instead
of "kingpins." BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 107. Eventually, Nixon
consolidated various drug-related agencies into the Drug Enforcement Agency,
the agency with primary responsibility for enforcing federal drug laws today.
Id. at 107-08; GRAY, DRUG CRAZY, supra note 31, at 96 (describing the
powers of the DEA).
38. Remarks on Signing Executive Order 12368, Concerning Federal Drug
Abuse Policy Functions, PUB. PAPERS (June 24, 1982); see also David Schultz,
Rethinking Drug Criminalization Policies, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 151, 165
(1993) (suggesting Reagan declared the war on drugs to deflect attention from
the recession and redirect it toward the national problem on the eve of midterm
Congressional elections).
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promotion.39  During Reagan's presidency, Congress showed its
support for the "war on drugs" by passing the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act, which increased sentence lengths for drug offenders.4 °
B. Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing41
In 1985, the New York Times broke the "crack story," reporting
that the potent drug allowed for an inexpensive and intense high that
offered a safer alternative to drugs requiring intravenous injection.42
Because of its low price, crack became a "blue-collar" drug with
mostly white users,43 although news images of "urban chaos" and
gang warfare suggested that inner city minorities comprised the bulk
of crack, or cocaine base, addicts. 44 When Len Bias, a promising
young basketball star slated to play for the Boston Celtics, died of
39. See BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 110-12; see also LOU CANNON,
PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME 25,'813 (2000) (discussing
President Reagan's domestic drug policy).
40. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841).
41. Federal sentencing laws and practices remain the narrow focus of this
Paper. A large part of the "war on drugs," however, has been interdiction and
international efforts to control drug supply. See, e.g., The Anti-Drug Effort in
the Americas and the Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Drug
Elimination Act: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere
of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 106th Cong. (1999). These "drug war"
policies have been charged with having negative transnational effects. See,
e.g., GRAY, supra note 5, at 80, 88-93.
42. Jane Gross, A New, Purified Form of Cocaine Causes Alarm as Abuse
Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1985, at Al, available at LEXIS, News
Library, N.Y. Times File.
43. GRAY, DRUG CRAZY, supra note 31, at 107.
44. Id.; see William Overend, Adventures in the Drug Trade: How 4,000
Colombians Took the 'Champagne Drug' to the Inner City and Turned L.A.
Into a Cocaine Capital, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1989, at 14, 38 ("Just as the white-
user population was beginning to peak... [cocaine] found its way to the
ghetto and... black gangs. With the spread of crack cocaine in the inner city,
a new and poorer user population was created.., overnight in the black
community .... Although many white users turned to crack, it became most
popular among inner-city blacks.").
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cocaine poisoning,45 his sudden death, and the dawn of crack,
46stimulated support for immediate and stiff anti-drug measures. 4  7
Congress responded with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.47
This legislation eliminated the federal judicial flexibility to
customize sentences based on the individual circumstances of
each case.48 Before this law, judges possessed great authority
in sentencing: They could choose the appropriate length of
incarceration or place a drug offender on probation or parole.49 The
1986 Act, however, adopted mandatory minimum sentences based on
limited criteria. 50  This removal of discretion fell in line with the
aims of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 5 1 designed, in part, to
"avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records. .. found guilty of similar criminal conduct." 52 Prior
45. Bias' Killer: Cocaine, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1986, at Cl, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Chi Trib. File, 1986 WL 2679260; Rick Reilly, When
the Cheers Turned to Tears, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 14, 1986, at 28,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Sports Illustrated File; 9 Days in June;
Drugs Claimed Two Sports Stars-and 149 Others, LIFE, Jan. 1987, at 83.
46. GRAY, DRUG CRAzY, supra note 31, at 107-08; Sterling, supra note 1,
at 408; see Jonathan Fuerbringer, Making the Punishment Fit the House's
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1986, at 4, available at LEXIS, News Library,
N.Y. Times File; David Reyes, Deaths of Sports Stars Raise Awareness at
Drug Centers, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1986, at Metro 2.
47. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-69 (1988).
48. E.g., Spencer, supra note 15, at 343.
49. Id.
50. Under the law, a judge could only consider the weight and kind of drug
involved in the offense and the defendant's criminal history. 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) (1988). The 1986 Act also removed the possibility of
parole or probation for most drug offenses. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B),
(b)(1)(C). In addition, this law extended imprisonment terms through
mandatory minimum sentences, id. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and appreciably
increased fines. Id. § 841(b)(1)(D), (b)(2), (b)(3).
The Supreme Court upheld the use of mandatory minimum sentences in
Harmelin v. Michigan. 501 U.S. 957, 962 (1991). Justice Scalia wrote for the
court, holding that the constitutional requirement of individualized sentencing
is limited to capital cases. Id. at 996. While the Court recognized that life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole constituted the second most
severe sentence possible, retroactive legislation or executive clemency offered
reasonable possibilities for reduction in a life sentence. Id. Individualized
sentencing requirements do not extend to mandatory minimum sentencing
regimes for drug offenses. Id.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 991-998 (1984).
52. Id. § 991(b)(1)(B); see JOSEPH C. CALPIN ET AL., ANALYTIC BASIS FOR
THE FORMULATION OF SENTENCING POLICY 1 (1982) ("Sentencing guidelines
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to these laws, a vast amount of criticism emerged raising fairness and
due process concerns associated with judicial discretion in
sentencing and challenging the disproportionate impact on people of
color.
5 3
The 1986 Act delineated mandatory minimum imprisonment
terms based only on the weight and type of the particular drug
involved in the offense.5 4  For example, a person convicted of
possessing one kilo of heroin, five kilos of cocaine, or fifty grams of
crack with the intent to distribute faced a mandatory, non-negotiable
prison term of ten years to life. 55  According to the Sentencing
Project, this provision instituted "a 100:1 quantity ratio between the
amount of crack and powder cocaine needed to trigger certain
provide a mechanism for making the sentencing decisionmaking process more
open, more visible, and more equitable by establishing an explicit and
objective basis for comparing offenders and the offenses they have
committed.").
53. See, e.g., WILLARD GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN
SENTENCING 32-34 (1974) (discussing racial bias among judges); EDWARD H.
LEVI, THE USE OF DISCRETION IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 22, 23 (1978) (1978
Herman Phleger Lecture, April 27, 1978, Stanford Law School) (suggesting
that broad discretion in the courts "does not recognize sufficiently policy
matters and proper political considerations"); Albert Reiss, Jr., Discretionary
Justice in the United States, in THE INVISIBLE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISCRETION
AND THE LAw 54 (1978) (discussing "de facto discrimination" where "[t]he
poor and minorities" were more likely to suffer under discretionary
sentencing); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW
WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973) (arguing against "the almost wholly unchecked and
sweeping powers we [gave] to judges in the fashioning of sentences" as
"terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of
law"). Cole argues that a just version of criminal law requires some degree of
discretion, "[t]he open-ended character of 'substantive justice' mechanisms
poses a constant threat to formal equality." COLE, supra note 10, at 185. Cole
asserts that discretion within a criminal system "is troubling" because
[i]t allows race and class stereotypes to guide decisionmakers. And it
fuels distrust and cynicism among the populace, who are asked to
accept on blind faith that juries and law enforcement officials [or
judges in the pre-sentencing guidelines era] are using their discretion
fairly, even as the system produces widely disparate results.
Id. at 186. But see, e.g., Debate: Mandatory Minimums in Drug Sentencing: A
Valuable Weapon in the War on Drugs or a Handcuff on Judicial Discretion?,
36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279 (1999) (debate between Judge Stanley Sporkin and
Congressman Asa Hutchinson) (presenting both sides).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) (1988).
55. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). If death or serious bodily injury resulted, the
offender faced double the mandatory incarceration term. Id.
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mandatory minimum sentences for [drug] trafficking. ' 6  The law
also imposed mandatory minimums on drug offenders possessing
much smaller quantities of drugs with the intent to distribute,57 as
well as for simple drug possession.58 Sentences included a
mandatory $1,000 fine and a permissive imprisonment of up to one
year for a first simple possession offense, a minimum of fifteen days
and up to two years in prison for a second offense, and ninety days to
three years incarceration for a third such offense. 59 In addition, the
law criminalized the distribution of illegal drugs within one thousand
feet of a vocational school or any college, junior college, or
university. 60 Offenders of this provision faced a minimum of forty
years' imprisonment.6'
The 1988 Congressional amendments enhanced the mandatory
minimum regime adopted two years earlier. Most troubling,
Congress increased penalties for "certain serious crack possession
offenses," while retaining the original penalties for possession of all
56. Crack Cocaine Sentencing Policy. Unjustified and Unreasonable, The
Sentencing Project, available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/
1003.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003). See supra note 10 for literature criticizing
this disparity and other instances of unequal treatment for crack versus powder
cocaine offenders.
57. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). A person confronted five to forty years of
incarceration for possessing one hundred grams of heroin, a half a kilo of
cocaine, or five grams of crack with the intent to distribute. Id. Again, if death
or serious bodily injury resulted, the term mandatory minimum term jumped to
twenty years, capped at life in prison. Id.
58. Id. § 844(a).
59. Id. The law also imposed a mandatory $2,500 fine for a second offense,
$5,000 for a third offense. Id.
60. Id. § 860(a). Federal laws had already criminalized the same activity
within one thousand feet of all elementary and secondary schools,
playgrounds, or public housing facilities. Id. § 845a (1970) (current version at
id. § 860). The law also criminalized the manufacture and possession of
controlled substances with intent to distribute in the same locations. Id. §
860(a) (1988).
61. Id. § 860(a). Offenders faced twice the maximum penalty authorized by
§ 841(b), which is twenty years to life. Id. § 841(b). As a second offense, an
offender faced sixty years to life in prison. Id. § 860(b). The law also imposed
a mandatory life term on any drug offender whose third drug violation
involved distributing an illegal drug to a person younger than twenty-one;
distributing controlled substances near educational institutions, public housing,
youth centers, swimming pools, or video arcades; or using youth younger than
eighteen to violate any federal drug law. Id. § 860(b)-(c).
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other controlled substances.62 The amendments required at least five
years' imprisonment for a first-time crack offender who possessed
more than five grams of the drug, while a first time offender
possessing more than five grams of heroin or cocaine could be
imprisoned up to one year.63 This sentencing disparity has been the
subject of sharp and continued criticism.
64
C. Sentencing Guidelines
Before the federal drug legislation overhaul began in 1986,
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to combat
"disparate sentencing practices for similarly situated defendants
62. Id. § 844(a) (1988).
63. Id. A second-time crack offender could face five to twenty years'
imprisonment for possessing just more than three grams of crack, while a third-
time offender faced the same sentence for possession ofjust one gram. Id.
64. See supra note 10 (criticizing crack-cocaine sentencing disparity in
mandatory minimums). In the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, Congress finally responded to widespread criticism of
comparatively drastic sentences for crack offenses by directing the Sentencing
Commission to conduct a study comparing various imprisonment sentences for
different forms of cocaine. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280006, 108 Stat. 1796
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 (1994)) (cocaine penalty
study). Congress also solicited recommendations for retaining or changing
disparate sentences for crack and cocaine. Id. The report concluded that the
100 to one ratio disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences in the
1986 Act proved unwarranted, as did the particularly long sentences for
"special crack offenses" in the 1988 amendments. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY iii (Feb. 1995), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
crack/execsum.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003); see also COLE, supra note 10, at
143; William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine
Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 1233, 1234-35 (1996); Press Release,
American Civil Liberties Union, Freedom Network, A Brave First Step: ACLU
Commends U.S. Sentencing Commission for Equitable Decision; Says
Congress Must Now End Disparity Between Crack, Powder Cocaine (Apr. 11,
1995), at http://archive.aclu.org/news/n041195a.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2003); Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission, U.S. Sentencing
Commission Submits New Recommendations on Cocaine Sentencing (Apr. 29,
1997), at http://www.ussc.gov/press/4press.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
Congress, however, has not changed the sentencing disparity between crack
and cocaine. Jesseca R.F. Grassley, Federal Cocaine Sentencing Policy
Following the 1995 Cocaine Report: Issues of Fairness and Just Punishment,
21 HAMLINE L. REv. 347, 370-71 (1998).
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among federal judges."65 This Act resulted in the creation of the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, charged with creating federal
sentencing guidelines that would embrace deterrence and
incapacitation.66 Although guidelines for drug violations did not take
force until 1987, the Commission started developing the guidelines
before the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 became law.
67
Consequently, Spencer argues, the Commission encountered a
dilemma: in order to set guidelines consistent with federal laws
previously in existence, the Commission had to consider mandatory
minimum legislation in setting its recommended sentencing ranges.68
In most respects, guidelines for federal drug law violations
resemble the mandatory minimum scheme.69 For instance, a "level
38" drug violation is one in which someone dies or suffers serious
65. Spencer, supra note 15, at 347-48; see supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
66. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1984); see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1984)
(detailing the factors to be considered in assessing "the need for the sentence
imposed"). While judges may not depart from the sentence ranges set forth in
the guidelines, the ranges should "maintain[] sufficient flexibility to permit
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors
not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices."
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
67. The Sentencing Reform Act created the Commission in 1984. Id. §§
991-998.
68. Spencer, supra note 15, at 351. Under the guidelines, Federal judges
consult a table to sentence offenders. The table includes two variables: the
gravity of the crime and the defendant's criminal history. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. (2000). Because the guidelines
require the court to consider a defendant's criminal history, instead of only the
type and amount of the drug involved, they might be characterized as
somewhat more sympathetic. The Sentencing Reform Act also allows for
departure from the guidelines if certain mitigating circumstances obtain; for
example, if the defendant provides "substantial assistance in the investigation
or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." 28 U.S.C.
§ 994 (n) (1984). Few low-level drug offenders possess knowledge useful
enough to avail themselves of this reduction.
69. The Supreme Court upheld the sentencing guidelines in Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court
that Congress' allocation of authority to the U.S. Sentencing Commission in
order to determine sentencing guidelines was "sufficiently specific and detailed
to meet constitutional requirements." Id. at 374. The Court also rejected
Mistretta's contention that the Sentencing Reform Act violated separation of
powers principles. Id. at 390.
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bodily injury from using an illicit drug that the offender distributed.7 °
Mandatory minimum legislation prescribed a minimum sentence of
twenty years,7' while the guidelines propose ranges beginning with
nineteen years, almost twenty-one years, or just more than twenty-
four years for this same offense, depending on the offender's prior
criminal history.72
The guidelines also approximate mandatory minimums for
possession convictions,73 although they delineate among various
drugs in addition to singling out crack from all other substances.74
While in some cases the guideline ranges provide imprisonment
terms that differ from mandatory minimums, they largely converge.
75
For instance, mandatory minimum legislation suggests permissive
ranges of up to one year imprisonment for the first non-crack
possession offense, fifteen days to two years for the second offense,
and ninety days to three years for a third offense. 76 The guidelines
advise relatively similar prison terms: between zero and six months
for a first, second, or third offense involving possession of "low-
grade" controlled substances, which might differ slightly from
mandatory minimum sentences, depending on the judge in each
case. 77  Unlike mandatory minimums for crack that require five
years' imprisonment in certain circumstances, 78 the guidelines
suggest either no incarceration or up to one year depending on the
defendant's prior crack possession history. 79  This difference,
70. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2000). This
provision also applies for intent to distribute. Id.
71. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1988).
72. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D .1 (2000).
73. Id. § 2D2.1; see also id. app.
74. Id. § 2D2.1(a). While the Guidelines do differentiate between many
different types of drugs based on potential harm, they impose the same
suggested sentence for drug trafficking on offenders possessing more than five
grams of crack, while not advocating the same for offenders possessing more
than five grams of any other substance. Id. § 2D2.1(b). The Guidelines still
reserve special treatment for crack. Id.
75. See id. § 2D2.1 (providing offense level for possession of various
drugs); id. app. (indicating sentence guideline based on offense level).
76. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988).
77. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D2. 1 (a)(3); id. app.
78. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988).
79. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D2.1 (a)(1); id. app.
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however, still penalizes crack offenders to a greater degree than
powder cocaine offenders.
80
D. Additional Sentencing Legislation
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act,8 1 which combined increased imprisonment terms
8 2
with alternative punishment,8 3 drug prevention8 4 and treatment,8 5 and
an "escape valve" allowing certain drug offenders to avoid
mandatory minimums.8 6 The 1994 Act added specific mandatory
minimum sentences for drug crimes involving guns. 87  The
80. See, e.g., Leitman, supra note 10, at 215-19 (discussing the disparate
impact of the federal sentencing guidelines between crack and cocaine).
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 (1994).
82. Id. §§ 14051-52; 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1994) (creating the three strikes
provision). The three strikes provision allows serious drug offenses to count as
one of the prior strikes leading to life imprisonment. Id. § 3559(c)(1)(A)(ii).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 13725 (creating correctional job training and placement
programs).
84. Id. § 13741-77; id. § 13862 (designating prosecutorial funds for
violence prevention programs); id. § 14061 (authorizing grants to reduce or
prevent juvenile drug activity in public or low-income housing); id. § 14222
(directing the Attorney General to consult with the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services in establishing and carrying out prevention
programs); id. § 14192 (creating a National Commission on Crime Control and
Prevention). The Commission is charged with developing proposals for
preventing crime, including compiling "a comprehensive study of the
economic and social factors leading to or contributing to crime and violence,
including the causes of illicit drug use and other substance abuse." Id.
§ 14193.
85. Id. § 13742(a)(4) (creating the "ounce of prevention grant program,"
supporting "treatment programs to reduce substance abuse"); id.
§ 13751 (a)(2)(A) (designating grants promoting "treatment, and rehabilitation
programs to prevent.., the use and sale of illegal drugs by juveniles"); id.
§ 13773(a) (authorizing grants to promote community substance abuse treatment
facilities); id. § 14222 (directing the Attorney General to consult with the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services in establishing and
carrying out substance abuse treatment programs).
86. 18 U.S.C § 3553(0 (1994).
87. See, e.g., id. § 924(c)-(e), (h), (j)-(o); Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110513,
108 Stat. 2019 (1994). Part of the 1994 crime bill, known as the Drive-by
Shooting Prevention Act of 1994, imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of
twenty-five years on drug offenders who fire a gun into a group of people
intending to "intimidate, harass, injure, or maim" members of the crowd in
order to further or evade detection for a major drug offense and who cause
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legislation also continued to impose fixed minimum sentences for
drug possession and distribution . 8  The 1994 law also created a
federal "three strikes" provision.8 9  This subsection imposed a
mandatory life imprisonment term for a defendant convicted of a
violent felony under federal law with two previous violent felonies,
two serious drug convictions, or one of each under federal or state
law. 90 Most notably, the 1994 law limited the applicability of
mandatory minimums in certain circumstances for certain non-
violent drug offenders. 91
"grave risk to any human life" in the process. Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 60008(b)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 36(b)(1) (1994)).
88. For example, the law doubled sentences authorized under 18 U.S.C.
§ 841(b) for offenders who distributed drugs within one thousand feet of a
public housing authority. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (1994). Offenders who used
children to distribute drugs near schools and playgrounds faced up to sixty
years to life in prison. Id. § 860(c) (1994). The law also directed the
Sentencing Commission to boost sentences for possessing, smuggling, or
distributing drugs in relation to a federal prison. 42 U.S.C. § 14052 (1994).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1994).
90. Id. § 3559(c)(1)(A). Because state law controls the prosecution of most
violent felonies, this provision may not gravely impact a large number of
violent offenders with prior drug convictions. Note, however, that the
definition of "serious violent felony" is quite broad and includes the following:
murder, manslaughter, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with intent
to commit rape, aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse, abusive sexual
contact, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, robbery, carijacking, extortion, arson,
firearms use, firearms possession, or any other offense punishable by a
maximum term of ten years' imprisonment or more that has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Id. § 3559(c)(2)(F).
91. Id. § 3553(f). In order to benefit from this provision, the defendant
must meet various requirements. First, the offender may not have more than
one prior conviction. Id. § 3553(f)(1). Second, the drug offense must be non-
violent, without any credible threat of violence or possession of a firearm or
other dangerous weapon. Id. § 3553(f)(2). Third, the drug offense must not
have resulted in death or serious bodily harm to any person. Id. § 3553(f)(3).
Fourth, the defendant must not have been a ringleader in the drug offense or
involved in a continuing criminal enterprise. Id. § 3553(f)(4). Finally, the
defendant must assist the government with as much information as he or she
possesses about events related to the drug offense. Id. § 3553(f)(5). If a
defendant meets these criteria, the sentencing court should disregard
mandatory minimums and impose an appropriate sentence pursuant to the
sentencing guidelines. Id. § 3553(f). Because of little difference between
mandatory minimums and the sentencing guidelines, this change may not
result in a great relief for eligible drug offenders. See supra notes 69-80 and
accompanying text.
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While outside the scope of this piece, the federal "drug war" exceeds
criminal sentencing legislation, and includes policies that also lend themselves
well to a comparative analysis. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2000) (Pub. L.
No. 101-625, § 503(b)) (providing for eviction from public housing based on
"any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises" or where "any
member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the
tenant's control" engages in drug-related criminal activity on or off the
premises); see also Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130
(2002) (rejecting a challenge to this provision); Linda Greenhouse, Supreme
Court Roundup, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at A 16 (describing the arguments
before the U.S. Supreme Court in Rucker), available at LEXIS, News Library,
N.Y. Times File, 2002 WL 13358234 ; Dahlia Lithwick, Too Old to Narc,
SLATE MAGAZINE, Feb. 19, 2002 (questioning the scope of the provision as
applied to the elderly), available at LEXIS, News Library, Slate Magazine
File; Warren Richey, One Strike and Out, in Public Housing, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 19, 2002, at 2 (describing the tenants being evicted under this
statute), available at LEXIS, News Library, Christian Sci. Monitor File, 2002
WL 6424199; Nina Totenberg, Public Housing Law that Goes Before the
Supreme Court Today, MORNING EDITION-NPR, Feb. 19, 2002 (interviewing
attorney representing public housing authorities across the country); Nina
Totenberg, Supreme Court Hears Case Regarding Zero Tolerance Drug Policy
at Housing Projects, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED-NPR, Feb. 19, 2002
(reviewing the government's oral argument before the Court); U.S. Supreme
Court: Housing Evictions Challenged; Elderly Say Drug Rules Hurt Innocent,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Feb. 20, 2002, at 7A (relating the policy arguments on
both sides), available at LEXIS, News Library, Atlanta J. Const. File.
Congress also authorized the denial of government benefits to offenders
convicted of felony drug violations under state or federal law. 21 U.S.C. §
862a (2000) (allowing states to exclude the drug felon from the household in
determining financial assistance to a family); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619
(2000); Patricia Allard, Life Sentences: Denying Welfare Benefits to Women
Convicted of Drug Offenses (detailing a recent study showing that at least
92,000 women have been affected by the law since its inception and noting
that many children exposed to highly stressful living environments perform
comparatively poorly in school, and they experience behavioral and emotional
problems, drug use, teenage pregnancy, and delinquency in disproportionate
numbers), at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/9088.pdf (last visited Oct.
7, 2003).
In 1998, Congress also extended "drug war" policies to affect financial
aid for secondary education. Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 483(f)(2), 112 Stat. 1581,
1736 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (1998)) (making a student
convicted of selling drugs ineligible for grants, loans, or work assistance for
two years from the date of a first conviction, or indefinitely upon a second
conviction and taking away financial aid from students convicted of possession
for one year for a first offense, two years for a second offense, and indefinitely
upon a third offense).
The Bush administration also has shown that the drug war includes
marijuana medicinal clubs. See Ann Harrison, Battle Brews as San Francisco
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III. ENGLAND AND WALES
A. Why Look Comparatively?
It may seem counterintuitive that an Article examining U.S.
legislation, enacted by political representatives whom the American
people have elected, would consider sentencing laws and practices
from a foreign legal system. One could argue that U.S. lawmakers
must determine the most appropriate federal sentencing scheme
based on the individual culture, politics, lawmaking system, and a
myriad of other peculiarities in the United States. True, only a
legislator serving the American populace ultimately can decide
which strategy U.S. federal sentencing policies should adopt.
Comparing U.S. sentencing legislation and its consequences to
another legal system, however, makes sense. In fact, as Hirschel and
Wakefield argue, "[u]ntil one looks at another system there is always
a tendency to take one's own system for granted, to assume that the
way it operates is either the best or the only way for it to work.
9 2
As mentioned, U.S. opponents of federal sentencing laws who have
taken a rights-based approach have met with little progress in
dismantling the current sentencing system.93 Realizing that the U.S.
drug sentencing approach presents one option among many may
persuade some legislators to take note of flaws in U.S. federal drug
sentencing policies as they currently exist.
Furthermore, investigating and thinking about how a foreign
jurisdiction tackles criminal sentencing for drug offenders produces
at least two helpful outcomes. At the outset, and most obviously,
looking abroad may provide resourceful legislators with specific,
pragmatic suggestions for how we might reconfigure "drug war"
sentencing as it currently exists. Perhaps most importantly,
considering alternate drug sentencing legislation in a nation with
Rebels Against Medical Marijuana Raids, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 14,
2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Agence France Presse File, 2002 WL
2339792. Federal agents raided one such center in San Francisco,
simultaneously to President Bush's unveiling of the National Drug Control
Strategy for 2002. Id.
92. J. DAVID HIRSCHEL & WILLIAM WAKEFIELD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 3 (1995).
93. See supra notes 10-11, 64, 69 and accompanying text.
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which the United States shares a long-held, reverent relationship 94
may successfully open U.S. policymakers to reevaluating drug
sentencing laws seriously. Such a project also might begin to
examine the normative underpinnings that inform each nation's drug
sentencing schemes and help us to think about what principles we
regard as preeminent in sentencing drug offenders.
To propose that a comparative undertaking proves worthy of
pursuit does not mean that the answer to sentencing for drug offenses
lies in another country's policies. This piece never suggests that
exploring alternatives will uncover a universal panacea for
sentencing drug offenders. As demonstrated, sentencing for drug
offenses involves complex and challenging questions, including,
among others, how we might recognize the individual circumstances
surrounding each drug offense, while at the same time taking earnest
precautions to avoid potential negative biases inherent in a system
premised only on judicial discretion.9" Even the most ambitious
scholars could not find an easy solution to such a multifaceted
problem through any pursuit, including a comparative one. Nor does
this Article posit that in comparing U.S. drug policies to those of
England we should pick and choose among the various stratagems or
adopt another system wholesale. This comparative exploration
involves a much less noble pursuit, but one that presents an
innovative way for exploring drug sentencing alternatives and that
might provide a new way for conceptualizing the weaknesses in the
U.S. system.
B. Why the United Kingdom?
Of course, any comparative project raises questions about the
profitability of making such an assessment. For example, skeptics
might insist that the United States and England diverge in many
regards. To begin with, Hirschel and Wakefield point out that any
country must "be understood in its cultural, social, economic, and
political context."96 Americans include more diverse populations by
race and ethnicity, for instance, than do the British.97 The English
94. See infra notes 100-03.
95. See supra Part II.
96. HIRSCHEL & WAKEFIELD, supra note 92, at 5.
97. See also infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text (citing statistics
indicating England's lopsided imprisonment of people of color). Compare
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also respect different cultural values as compared to Americans,
including a "greater tolerance ... for deviance" and less acceptance
of violence, especially the use of firearms, according to Hirschel and
Wakefield.98 In addition, Britain, unlike the United States, retains
the monarch and the royal family, but at the same time has socialist
programs to assist all Britons, particularly the poor.
99
On the other hand, a comparison between drug sentencing in the
United States with that of England works for a few reasons.'0 First,
as Hirschel and Wakefield maintain, both legal systems share the
same origin, which yields both a straightforward analysis and one
whose function and sensibility fit, given the familiar foundation the
jurisdictions share. 1 1 Moreover, the United States and England
continue to align themselves as joint actors in the international
community, reflecting a common approach and similar political
objectives in many cases. 10 2 England also has heeded U.S. advice in
Profiles of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000 Census of Population
and Housing, U.S. Census Bureau (suggesting that 75.1% of Americans are
white, non-Hispanic), at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/dpl/2kh00.pdf
(last visited Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Profiles of General Demographic
Characteristics] , with ANITA KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, RACE AND DRUG
TRIALS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GUILT AND INNOCENCE xiv (1999)
(citing British statistics from 1985 that blacks comprised eight percent of male
prisoners and twelve percent of female prisoners while their general population
in England and Wales hovered between one and two percent).
98. HIRSCHEL & WAKEFIELD, supra note 92, at 12-13.
99. Id. at 13-14.
100. I use "England" to refer to England and Wales throughout this piece.
101. HIRSCHEL & WAKEFIELD, supra note 92, at 4.
102. Most recently, the United States and England joined forces in a military
effort to oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, with little international support.
See, e.g., Blair Starts Mission to Secure War Consensus, WESTERN MORNING
NEWS (Plymouth), Jan. 29, 2003, at 24, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Western Morning News (Plymouth) File, 2003 WL 7974487; Julian Coman &
Colin Brown, An Unruly Alliance: Tomorrow, Hans Blix Will Give His Report
on Weapons Inspections. His Expected Plea for More Time Comes as Britain
and the U.S. Struggle for Allies for a War in the Gulf, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), Jan. 26, 2003, at 18, available at 2003 WL 7190720; G. Robert
Hillman, U.S., British Troops Cross into Iraq, Pound Baghdad with Airstrikes,
THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 21, 2003, at 2A, available at LEXIS,
News Library, The Dallas Morning News File; Edith M. Lederer, U.S., Allies
Want March 17 Iraq Deadline, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 7, 2003, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Associated Press File, 2003 WL 14960954; Text of
Joint Statement by Blair and Bush, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 8, 2003,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Associated Press File, 2003 WL 18222638;
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constructing its drug policy in years past, arguably learning from
following our "example." 10 3 Finally, Britain has enacted the most
Today is UN's Last Chance to Act; Blair and Bush in Final Ultimatum, DAILY
POST (Liverpool), Mar. 17, 2003, at 4, 5, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Daily Post (Liverpool) File; Brian Walker, Blair Joins President to Rally
Support; Bush Promises Evidence on Iraq, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Jan. 29,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Belfast Telegraph File; Philip
Webster & Roland Watson, Saddam is on the Ropes, Say US and Britain, THE
TIMES (London), Jan. 22, 2003, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, The
Times(London) File, 2003 WL 3097587. Even before this most recent military
exercise, Prime Minister Tony Blair backed President Bush's opposition to
Iraq generally in the international "war on terror." See Doug Ireland, Bad
Posture; Bush's New Nukes and Far-Flung Bases Take the War into a
Dangerous New Phase, IN THESE TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at 10, available at
LEXIS, News Library, In These Times File. The nations' participation in
cooperative military action precedes the dismantling of Saddam Hussein's
government in Iraq. See Mahmud Dehqan, Iran: Paper Says Blair, Bush Must
Calm Muslims' Anger to Avoid Adverse Consequences, BBC MONITORING
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Apr. 12, 2002 (recounting the various meetings
between American and English leaders before launching joint military attacks),
available at LEXIS, News Library, BBC Monitoring International Reports File
. In the view of the international media, the two countries have generally allied
themselves. See, e.g., Bela Arora, Chamber Made: Blair Too Close to Bush
for Comfort!, BIRMINGHAM EVENING MAIL, Apr. 12, 2002, at 27 ("It seems as
though the British Government is in fact promoting a new form of cloning, as
Mr[.] Blair has taken to mimicking and copying American policy."), available
at LEXIS, News Library, Birmingham Evening Mail File; John Bersia, Strains
in the 'Special Relationship'; U.S.-British Tensions Not Unusual, Bad,
ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIBUNE, Apr. 15, 2002, at A15 ("[T]he United States
and Britain are fated to work together. They stand to derive the most from a
relationship that resists periodic fraying, and maintains its special tradition,
intimacy and vitality."), available at LEXIS, News Library, Orlando Sentinel
Tribune File, 2002 WL 3041847; Mahmud Dehqan, supra, (discussing a
British proverb that analogizes the U.S.-England relationship "to a pair of
scales where money and power rests in the American pan and wisdom in the
British pan"); Miki Kase, US. Allies Must Engage More, THE DAILY YOMIURI
(Tokyo), Apr. 13, 2002 (calling Prime Minister Tony Blair the "American
ambassador"), at 17, available at LEXIS, News Library, The Daily
Yomiuri(Tokyo) File, 2002 WL 19069874.
103. See GRAY, DRUG CRAZY, supra note 31, at 44-45 (discussing U.S.
influence on Britain to prohibit opium use in the early twentieth century); id. at
154 (writing that "the Americans asked the English to 'harmonize' their drug
policy with the United States approach" with respect to psychiatrists
prescribing narcotics to drug addicts as an element of treatment); id. at 162
(suggesting that the closure of a community healthcare clinic that prescribed
heroin and cocaine to addicts mimicked American "total abstinence policies");
id. at 169-70 (implicating American complicity in the failures of the drug war
in the United Kingdom); GRAY, supra note 5, at 199 ("For whatever reason,
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penal laws of all the nations in Western Europe and the European
Union. 1°4 Relative to the United States, however, England has
markedly fewer people incarcerated and uses a more variable
approach to drug sentencing. 05 Thus, this comparison provides an
alternative system that American legislators can take seriously,
because it takes a different, but not too radical, approach.10 6
the British decided to follow the lead of the United States... and we
convinced them that emphasizing total abstinence was the way to go .... In
short, the British experience began to parallel our own"); KALUNTA-
CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at 25 (arguing that "Britain only attended [an
international opium conference] after pressure from America); Robert Sharpe,
US NY: OPED: U.S. Should Follow Europe's Lead in Drug-Law, NEWSDAY
(New York), Jan. 3, 2002 ("In response to U.S. pressure, prescription
heroin maintenance was discontinued in 1971."), available at http://
www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v02/n009/a04.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) ;
Ethan A. Nadelmann, Commonsense Drug Policy: Foreign Affairs ("This
tradition [of prescribing drugs to treat addicted patients] flourished until the
1960s, and has reemerged in response to aids and to growing disappointment
with the Americanization of British prescribing practices during the 1970s and
1980s, when illicit heroin use in Britain increased almost tenfold."), available
at http://www.tni.org/drugs/links/foreigna.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
104. See MARTIN WASIK & RICHARD D. TAYLOR, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1991: THE 1991 ACT IN THE COURTS 2 (1994)
("UK custodial population is 97.4 per 100,000 as compared with France (81.1),
Sweden (50.6), Greece (44.0) and Holland (40.0)."); Adam J. Smith, Drug War
Retreat: England Moves to Decriminalize Narcotics, IN THESE TIMES, Dec. 7,
2001, available at http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/26/03/newsl.shtml
("'After 30 years under some of the harshest drug policies in the European
Union, Britain's drug problem is among the worst in Europe."').
105. James P. Lynch et al., Profile of Inmates in the United States and in
England and Wales, 1991, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Oct. 1994) (comparing
U.S. incarceration rate of 640 per 100,000 with the 119 per 100,000 in
England), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/walesus.pdf (Oct. 1994) ;
see also DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 165 (2001) ("the punitive and
incapacitive thrust of American policies has been markedly greater, and
sustained over a much longer period, than is the case in the UK"); see also
infra notes 181-86.
106. This piece is not the first to engage in a U.S.-England comparison in the
area of criminal justice. See, e.g., Lynch et al., supra note 105; Patrick A.
Langan & David P. Farrington, Crime and Justice in the United States and in
England and Wales, 1981-96, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Oct. 1998), at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjusew96h.pdf (last revised Nov. 6,
1998); GARLAND, supra note 105, at vii (comparing "the culture of crime
control and criminal justice in Britain and America"); HIRSCHEL &
WAKEFIELD, supra note 92 (comparing the criminal justice system in England
to the United States, including law enforcement and the judicial and
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C. The Beginnings of Drug Control in England
The English instituted drug control laws before the U.S. federal
government did, imposing restrictions on opium, cannabis, and
morphine in the 1868 Pharmacy Act.
10 7 Similar to U.S. policies, 10 8
bias fueled a prevalent concern with drug addiction-in this case
socio-economic or class-based bias rather than racial or ethnic
prejudice, according to Kalunta-Crumpton. 10 9  Britons feared
recreational use of opium among working-class people, justifying
regulations on certain substances. 10 She asserts that "the 'disease'
theory developed in the late nineteenth century by the medical
profession to explain alcoholism was later applied principally to
explain the middle-class addiction to opium-a view which called
for treatment and cure involving gradual withdrawal and
maintenance prescribing on low dosages of opiates.""'1
correctional systems); Silvia S.G. Casale & Sally T Hillsman, National
Institute of Justice, Executive Summary: The Enforcement of Fines as Criminal
Sanctions: The English Experience and Its Relevance to American Practice
(Nov. 1986) (examining the imposition and enforcement of fines as criminal
sanctions for assault offenses in four English magistrates' courts). At least one
other comparison between the United States and England has been made that
specifically addresses illicit drugs. See, e.g., HORACE FREELAND JUDSON,
HEROIN ADDICTION IN BRITAIN: WHAT AMERICANS CAN LEARN FROM THE
ENGLISH EXPERIENCE (1974) (exploring heroin maintenance and the use of
addiction treatment clinics in England). Some drug policy experts also pursue
comparisons between the United States and Western Europe generally. See,
e.g., Hans-J6rg Albrecht, Drug Policies and National Plans to Combat Drug
Trafficking and Drug Abuse: A Comparative Analysis of Policies of Co-
ordination and Co-operation, in POLICIES AND STRATEGIES TO COMBAT
DRUGS IN EUROPE; THE TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION: FRAMEWORK FOR
A NEW EUROPEAN STRATEGY TO COMBAT DRUGS? 182 (Georges Estievenart
ed., 1995); Robert MacCoun et al., Comparing Drug Policies in North America
and Western Europe, in POLICIES AND STRATEGIES TO COMBAT DRUGS IN
EUROPE; THE TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION: FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW
EUROPEAN STRATEGY TO COMBAT DRUGS? 197 (Georges Estievenart ed.,
1995).
107. PHILIP BEAN, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF DRUGS 19-20 (1974);
KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at 26; HARVEY TEFF, DRUGS, SOCIETY
AND THE LAW 10 (1975).
108. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
109. KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at 26-27.
110. Id.
11. Id. at 27 (emphasis added). In addition to overuse of opium as a
recreational, working-class drug, "[o]ther views were that the self-indulgence
and recreational use of opiate was a vice, a deviance and a social problem
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Accordingly, the 1916 Defence of the Realm Act criminalized
the non-medical use of cocaine, heroin, hemp, opium, and
morphine. 1 2 Next came the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1920, which
moved away from viewing drug use as a medical problem and began
to criminalize drug activities, paralleling the development of U.S.
legal controls in the early twentieth century." 3 Britons could no
longer legally possess, distribute, or import cocaine, heroin, or
morphine without a medical prescription. 1 4 The 1923 Dangerous
Drugs and Poisons Act added court-fashioned penalties for illegal
possession and supply of drugs and expanded law enforcement
power to conduct searches for illicit substances. 1 5 Simultaneously,
doctors continued to advocate treating drug addiction as a medical
condition, ultimately helping to establish the "'British system' of
maintenance prescribing for dealing with drug addiction."" 
6
meant to be eradicated through methods of penal control." Id. As in the
United States, early drug control laws grew out of the international conference
on opium in Asia in 1909 and the Hague in 1912. BEAN, supra note 107, at 19,
20-26; KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at 25, 28; P.W.H. LYDIATE, THE
LAW RELATING TO THE MISUSE OF DRUGS 1 (1977); TEFF, supra note 107, at
13-14.
112. KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at 27; LYDIATE, supra note 111,
at 1; see BEAN, supra note 107, at 28-30.
113. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
114. KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at 28. Teff points out that this
legislation established the "British system" of prescribing low doses of
controlled substances to addicts. See infra note 116 and accompanying text;
TEFF, supra note 107, at 15-16. This law was interpreted to allow doctors to
prescribe addicts with morphine or heroin as treatment, for maintenance, or to
help the patient lead a productive life. BEAN, supra note 107, at 62-63; TEFF,
supra note 107, at 15. This configuration helped categorize drug addiction as a
medical and criminal problem. TEFF, supra note 107, at 16. Bean argues that
this law hastened the view that "although varying factors may be present, drug
addiction should be regarded as a manifestation of a disease and not a form of
vicious indulgence." BEAN, supra note 107, at 62.
115. BEAN, supra note 107, at 31; KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at
28.
116. KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at 29. This system involved
doctors prescribing narcotics or opiates to help addicts control their addictions.
See id.; Griffith Edwards, Some Years On: Evolutions in the "British System ",
in PROBLEMS OF DRUG ABUSE IN BRITAIN: PAPERS PRESENTED TO THE
CROPWOOD ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE 1 (D.J. West ed., 1977).
Kalunta-Crumpton argues that racial prejudice energized the next round
of drug control legislation enforcement in Britain, in response to the
emigration of West Indians and Asians. KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97,
at 29. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1925 already criminalized cannabis
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The Dangerous Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act of 1964
extended the criminalization of drug possession to additional illicit
substances and required registration of manufacturers and
wholesalers in controlled drugs. 117 Lydiate suggests that Parliament
meant this legislation to respond to "the widespread misuse of
amphetamines which had occurred in the early 1960's mainly
because of their availability as a result of over-prescribing." 18 Three
years later, 1967 brought an end to the treatment approach to drug
addiction when, according to Kalunta-Crumpton, the Dangerous
Drugs Act reduced "authority to prescribe addictive drugs for
maintenance of physical and psychological dependence... to a
limited number of medical facilities, and more emphasis was placed
on persuading addicts to either use less addictive drugs or abstain
completely."' 19 The law required the reporting of heroin addicts and
imposed restrictions on providing them with prescriptions for "drugs
smoking. BEAN, supra note 107, at 39-40; LYDIATE, supra note 111, at 2
("This Act replaced all previous legislation: it continued to control narcotics
and, for the first time, imposed controls on the misuse of cannabis (known as
Indian Hemp)."). Kalunta-Crumpton maintains, however, that this influx of
racial and ethnic minorities prompted vigorous prosecution of recent
immigrants between 1946 and 1959. KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at
29-30. In fact, the English government asserted to the League of Nations that
use of cannabis was "confined to Arab and Indian seamen," "mainly orientals,"
and "practically confined to two [N]egro groups in London." Id. at 29. The
British government likewise associated the Chinese with opium use. Id. at 31.
Eventually, blacks became associated with marijuana, prompting law
enforcement to focus their efforts on frequent drug raids and arrests in black
neighborhoods in the 1960s, even though cannabis use was not confined to
black populations. Id. Compare racial bias in the development of the U.S.
federal sentencing regime, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
117. KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at 34-35. Prior to the 1964 law,
other drug control legislation came into existence. The Pharmacy Poisons Act
passed in 1933 "regulates the sale and supply of listed poisons" and "subject[s]
narcotics and cannabis to the Poisons Rules which restrict their sale and
supply." LYDIATE, supra note 111, at 2. Parliament amended the 1933 Act in
1956 to add amphetamines and barbiturates to the list of poisons. Id. The
1950 and 1951 versions of the Dangerous Drugs Act replaced the 1932 Act but
"continued to control narcotics and cannabis." Id.
118. LYDIATE, supra note 111, at 2-3. Lydiate notes, however, that this law
"did not solve the problem of amphetamine misuse, because over-prescribing
continued to be the main source of supply for unlawful suppliers and users."
Id. at 3.
119. KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at 32-33; see BEAN, supra note
107, 'at 83; TEFF, supra note 107, at 22-23.
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of dependency.' 20 This change in the law sprouted hospital-based
treatment centers for drug addicts that allowed specially licensed
doctors, mostly psychiatrists, to prescribe heroin and cocaine to treat
patients dependent on drugs.
12'
D. English Drug Sentencing Legislation
In 1971, Parliament passed the Misuse of Drugs Act ("MDA"),
which encompasses the breadth of national drug sentencing
legislation in England today.1 22  Scholars contend that the
fragmentary, inadequate, and inflexible nature of previous drug
legislation served as the impetus for this law.' 23 Lydiate writes that
Parliament wanted to "provide a comprehensive and flexible scheme
for controlling the misuse of drugs."' 24 Further, scholars note that
none of the preceding laws sufficiently addressed drug misuse
because they were focused on trafficking and distribution. 125 Lastly,
according to Lydiate, earlier drug controls did not allow for a great
enough distinction in sentencing between drug traffickers as
compared to possessors and failed to address medical over-
prescribing. 
126
Much like the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970,127 the MDA classified illicit substances based
on their perceived harmfulness. 2 8  Unlike existing United States
federal drug policies in America, 129 however, the MDA imposed
different penalties based on the danger of the drug and the offense
120. LYDIATE, supra note 111, at 3; see BEAN, supra note 107, at 83-84.
121. KALUNTA-CRUMPTON, supra note 97, at 33.
122. Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38 (Eng.).
123. BEAN, supra note 107, at 88; LYDIATE, supra note 111, at 3-4.
124. LYDIATE, supra note 111, at 4.
125. BEAN, supra note 107, at 88; LYDIATE, supra note 111, at 4.
126. LYDIATE, supra note 111, at 4.
127. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
128. Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38, sched. 2, Parts I-III (Eng.). The Act
divides controlled substances into three classes according to harmfulness. Id.
The danger of each drug takes into account toxic effect, pervasiveness of
abuse, and the perceived danger to society. LYDIATE, supra note 111, at 9.
Class A includes drugs such as cocaine and heroin. Misuse of Drugs Act,
1971, c. 38, sched. 2Part I, (Eng.). Class B contains amphetamines and
codeine. Id. Part II. Class C consists of the least harmful drugs or mild
stimulants. Id.
129. See supra Part II.
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committed, whether possession, production, importation, exportation,
supply, or sale. 130 In addition, British legislators opted for maximum
sentences, or ceilings,13 1 rather than the mandatory minimum
sentence lengths used in the United States.
132
Instead of determining the mandatory minimum sentence based
only on the type and amount of drug involved in the offense as in the
U.S. drug sentencing scheme, 133 the British MDA provides the
sentencing judge with the maximum sanction that may be imposed
given the type of offense, the class of the drug involved, and the
court in which the case takes place. 34 In England, adult criminal
offenders may be tried in one of two ways: in a jury trial in the
Crown Court (once indicted), or a non-jury, summary trial in a
Magistrates' Court, unless a statutory exception applies. 35  The
majority of criminal cases take place summarily before magistrates,
who are primarily prominent lay members of the community who
also serve as justices of the peace.136 As compared to Crown Court
proceedings, most summary trials before magistrates take place
quickly, informally, and often on guilty pleas.'
37
130. Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38, sched. 4 (Eng.).
131. See id.; LYDIATE, supra note 111, at 10.
132. Compare Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38, sched. 4 (Eng.) with supra
Part II.B.
133. See supra notes 54, 68 and accompanying text.
134. Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38, sched. 4 (Eng.).
135. PHILIP ASTERLEY JONES & RICHARD CARD, CROSS AND JONES'
INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW 389 (8th ed. 1976); TERENCE INGMAN, THE
ENGLISH LEGAL PROCESS 47 (8th ed. 2000); C.F. SHOOLBRED, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 9 (1966).
136. JONES & CARD, supra note 135, at 389; E.C. FRIESEN & I.R. SCOTT,
ENGLISH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION FOR AMERICAN READERS 29,
33 (1977); HIRSCHEL & WAKEFIELD, supra note 92, at 111, 219. Larger
metropolitan areas also employ full-time, paid district judges who possess the
same jurisdiction as lay magistrates. INGMAN, supra note 135, at 43-44.
Local advisory committees accept nominations for lay magistrates from
various groups and forward their recommendations to the Lord Chancellor,
who appoints the selected magistrates. Id. at 44. Magistrates must reside
within fifteen miles of the jurisdiction they serve and must retire at age
seventy-two. Id. at 44-45.
137. FRIESEN & SCOTT, supra note 136, at 33; INGMAN, supra note 135, at
46 (noting that about ninety percent of defendants plead guilty on summary
offenses).
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The sentence imposed at the jury or summary trial depends on
which court hears the case.138 For example, a person convicted of
supplying a "Class A" or "Class B" drug could receive up to six
months' imprisonment, a £2,000 fine, or both in a summary trial
before magistrates.139 A drug offender who supplied a "Class C"
drug would face a potential term of up to three months, a £2,500 fine,
or both on summary conviction.' 40 In the Crown Court, however, an
offender supplying a "Class A" drug could receive up to life
imprisonment,14 1 while a drug defendant convicted of supplying a
"Class B" drug could face a fourteen-year sentence. 142 The "Class
C" drug supplier could receive a five- year sentence. 143  As
mentioned, however, magistrates dispose of most criminal cases,
including drug offenses.
144
Sentences for simple possession offenses also rely on the type of
offense, the type of drug possessed, and the court in which the trial
occurs. For instance, possession of opium or morphine, both "Class
A" drugs, would carry a maximum sentence of six months'
138. Under the Magistrates' Court Act of 1980, magistrates may not
sentence a defendant who could have been tried in the Crown Court to more
than six months' imprisonment or more than a £5,000 fine. Magistrates'
Courts Act 1980, §§ 31(1), 32(1), 32(9). According to Ingman, if the
magistrates hearing the case believe the offense "is so serious that greater
punishment should be inflicted than they have power to impose," which is six
months, then the case may be committed to the Crown Court for sentencing.
INGMAN, supra note 135, at 50. The Crown Court is not bound by the same
sentencing limits. Id. In addition to incarceration or fines, "[o]ther sentences
available to the court.., include absolute discharge, conditional discharge,
probation, community service order and compensation order." Id. at 46.
139. Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38, sched. 4 (Eng.).
140. Id.
141. Controlled Drugs (Penalties) Act, 1985, c. 39, § 1 (Eng.) (stating the
punishment for a person convicted of offenses under sections 4(2) and 5(2)
under the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act shall be substituted "life" instead of
fourteen years).
142. Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38, § 4(3), sched. 4 (Eng.). The Court
could impose an unlimited fine, up to the appropriate maximum sentence, or
both for each offense. Controlled Drugs (Penalties) Act, 1985, c. 39, § I
(Eng.); Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38, § 4(3), sched. 4 (Eng.).
143. Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38, § 4(3), sched. 4 (Eng.). The Court
could impose an unlimited fine in the alternative of the prison term, or both.
Id.
144. See supra note 136.
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imprisonment, a £2,000 fine, or both. 145 Possession of "Class B"
drugs could mean up to half that incarceration term but a steeper fine
of £2,500. 146 Finally, possession of a "Class C" mild stimulant could
land the offender in prison for three months, require a £1,000 fine, or
both.
147
While the Misuse of Drugs Act currently remains the law
governing controlled substances in England, British Home Secretary
David Blunkett announced in September 2003 that a new
government policy would reclassify marijuana as a "Class C" drug,
meaning an end to arresting, or even cautioning people who possess
marijuana. 148 Those discovered smoking the drug near schools or
playgrounds face arrest, however, and confiscation of the drug.
149
Government officials also are considering loosening restrictions on
the distribution of medical prescriptions for heroin to addicts and
lowering the classification for ecstasy. 150  In addition, the Police
Foundation published a report in 2000 recommending downgrading
the classifications for LSD, ecstasy, and cannabis, and eliminating
prison sentences for simple possession of "Class B" and "Class C"
drugs.
151
145. Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38, § 5(2), sched. 4 (Eng.). In the Crown
Court, the penalty would be a maximum of seven years, an unlimited fine, or
both. Id.
146. Id. Before the Crown Court, the sanction could reach up to five years'
incarceration, an unlimited fine, or both. Id.
147. Id. The imprisonment term could be up to two years, a fine, or both in a
Crown Court jury trial. Id.
148. See, e.g., Britain to Reduce Marijuana Penalties; Possession of Drug
Would Be Nonarrestable Offense, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WKLY., Nov.
12, 2001, at 8; England OKS Recreational Marjuana, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Sept. 12, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, United Press Int'l File; Ian
Burrell, 2001 Review of the Year: Drugs-War on Drugs Disappears in a
Cloud of Smoke; Token Gesture: Cannabis Becomes Class-C Drug, INDEP.
(London), Dec. 28, 2001, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library, Indep. File;
Smith, supra note 104; Jacob Sullum, British Drug Reform - Pot Stops,
REASON, Apr. 2002, at 14.
149. England OKs Recreational Marjuana, supra note 150.
150. Smith, supra note 104.
151. Part 1, National Strategies: Institutional and Legal Framework,
DrugScope (2001), at http://www.drugscope.org.uk/druginfo/drugsearch/ds-
reportresults.asp?file=\wip\1 l\3\003chapterl.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2003);
Jason Bennetto, Inquiry Calls for Softer Line on Hard Drugs-But Blair Says
No, INDEP. (London), Mar. 29, 2000, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Indep. File, 2000 WL 7595622; T.R. Reid, British Commission Concludes
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IV. U.S. AND ENGLISH DRUG SENTENCING LEGISLATION COMPARED
Even assuming that magistrates and Crown Court judges often
sentence drug offenders to the maximum possible sentence in
summary trials, 52 the sentences vary from the mandatory minimum
and sentencing guideline system in the United States. 153 The English
and U.S. sentencing regimes for simple possession of controlled
drugs seems similar, except for offenses involving marijuana and
crack. As discussed, mandatory minimum legislation and sentencing
guidelines in the United States penalize offenders possessing smaller
amounts of crack as compared to those possessing larger quantities
of all other illicit substances. 154 1988 Amendments to the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act increased the penalties for possession of crack based on
the amount possessed and the defendant's prior criminal history. 
55
A U.S. defendant possessing crack with no previous drug offenses
must serve a five-year prison term for possessing five grams of the
illicit drug, while U.S. courts may impose up to one year
imprisonment on a defendant possessing any "personal use" amount
of other serious drugs that are classified as "Class A" drugs in
England.
156
Tough Drug Law 'Produces More Harm' WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2000, at A 14,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Wash. Post File, 2000 WL 2292917; David
Taylorhome, Police: Make Ecstasy Legal, EXPRESS, Mar. 29, 2000, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Express File.
152. Statistics on average sentence length imposed on drug offenders
participating in summary trials and the frequency with which these cases
become committed to the Crown Court for sentencing would require analyzing
the drug cases before the approximately thirty-thousand magistrates serving in
about seven hundred courts throughout England and Wales. See INGMAN,
supra note 135, at 44. Ingman aptly points out that "[p]recise uniformity is
impossible to achieve unless Parliament were to lay down fixed penalties for
each offence." Id. at 61. He argues that regimented sentences "would be most
undesirable as [they] would exclude [the] flexibility which the court needs in
order to arrive at the most appropriate penalty in the light of any mitigating
circumstances." Id. at 62. Ingman concedes that "[v]ariations in sentences for
the same offence are inevitable as long as there is a system in which
Parliament lays down a maximum but no minimum penalty." Id. Compare
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
153. See supra Part II.B-D.
154. See supra notes 62-64, 78-80 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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Possession for most controlled drugs in England carries a
maximum incarceration period of three to six months depending on
the type of drug involved in a summary trial, and a maximum of two
to seven years in a jury trial.' 5 7 Even without data indicating the
average or commonly imposed prison term on drug possessors in
either country, sentencing laws addressing crack possession in the
United States as compared to "Class A" drugs in England present the
most prominent sentencing difference. In Britain, an offender
possessing five grams of crack could serve from zero to six months'
incarceration; while in the United States, the same first-time offender
must serve five years' incarceration.
1 58
Possession of controlled drugs with the intent to sell provides an
even more helpful example. An American federal court must impose
at least a ten-year prison term on a defendant who possessed a kilo of
heroin, five times that amount of powder cocaine, or only fifty grams
of crack.159 Federal law in the United States caps the allowable term
for this offense at life imprisonment.160 British law differs. In a
summary proceeding, a person possessing any "Class A" or "Class
B" drug with the intent to distribute might face up to six months'
imprisonment, with half that maximum term permissive for a "Class
C" offense. 16 1 The maximum penalties jump for jury trials to life
imprisonment for a "Class A" offense, fourteen years for a "Class
B," and five years for a "Class C" violation. 62  In most cases,
offenders convicted of possessing drugs with the intent to sell receive
drastically different treatment in the U.S. as compared to England. A
criminal defendant who possessed one kilogram of heroin, or five
kilos of cocaine, must serve at least ten years under United States
federal law, while the same offender may receive six months'
imprisonment at the very most in a British summary trial. 1
63
157. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 63, 141 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
160. See id.
161. Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38, § 5(3), sched. 4 (Eng.). Class "C"
drug offenses may be punished with a fine, or three-month imprisonment, or
both. Id.
162. Id.
163. Of course, in cases with original jurisdiction in the Crown Court, these
offenders could spend the remainder of their lives in prison. Id. Also,
magistrates hearing the case could decide to remove it to the Crown Court for
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Again, however, sentencing for crack offenses presents the most
striking difference. Federal law in the United States requires a
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years for possessing five
kilograms of cocaine as compared to only fifty grams of crack. This
policy means that an offender possessing only 100 grams of crack
and a defendant possessing one hundred times that amount of
cocaine would receive the same sentence. 64 The same does not hold
true in England. Offenders possessing crack or cocaine with an
intent to sell the drug will face a maximum of six months'
imprisonment in a summary proceeding.
65
These examples illustrate some significant differences between
criminal sentencing legislation in England as compared to the United
States. English statutes include fixed ceilings for sentences, allowing
judges the discretion to impose any incarceration sentence up to that
maximum prison term, or none at all. Magistrates and Crown Court
judges presumably could consider a myriad of factors in selecting an
appropriate sentence length or in choosing alternate sanctions,
including mitigating or aggravating factors, prior convictions or
sentence terms, or drug addiction or dependence. In contrast, laws
requiring mandatory minimum sentences constrain judges applying
federal law in the United States, who may consider only the type and
amount of drug involved in the particular offense, and in some cases,
the defendant's drug offense history. Although the sentencing
guidelines give U.S. judges some discretion to tinker with a sentence,
this discretion is quite narrowly drawn.
166
In addition, British drug sentencing legislation penalizes
categories of purportedly more dangerous drugs as compared to
others. The MDA classifies controlled substances into different
categories and imposes maximum prison terms and fines for different
offenses given that classification.' 7 Courts hearing drug cases retain
the discretion to consider the amount of the statutorily classified drug
involved in the offense and may impose more stringent sentences
sentencing if they deem the offense serious enough to warrant doing so. See
supra note 140.
164. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 133-49 and accompanying text.
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within the statutory allotment based on that factor.' 68 Legislation in
the United States, on the other hand, treats drugs offenders
differently based on the amount of each particular drug involved in a
case.169 The statutorily mandated amounts that trigger mandatory
minimum sentences in the United States oblige courts to penalize
crack offenders more harshly than offenders involved with any other
type of illicit drug, without regard to the potential dangerousness of
that drug as compared to crack. 1
70
V. COMPARING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE
DRUG SENTENCING SCHEMES
Sentencing for drug offenses in the United States and England
differs in three main ways. First, the British system constrains
judges with maximum incarceration terms instead of mandating
minimum sentences. Second, English law bestows considerable
leeway on magistrates to deal with criminal drug offenders, from
discharging a drug indictment to imposing community service, a
sizable fine, or a six-month prison term. Magistrates alternatively
can seek to commit especially troubling drug cases to the Crown
Court for sentencing. Finally, British drug statutes impose sentences
based on the perceived danger of the drug, while U.S. legislation
penalizes crimes involving small amounts of crack as harshly as
much larger amounts of other drugs that pose an equally great
danger.
Understanding these major differences between the two systems
provides a good foundation for a more nuanced comparative
analysis. While on paper, criminal drug sentencing legislation looks
markedly different in England as compared to the United States,
examining the practical effect of the two systems provides more
insight. Evaluating some of the major consequences of each system
side-by-side will help us to evaluate how different the systems prove
in practical effect.
168. See supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 54-91 and accompanying text.
170. Id.
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A. An Emphasis on Incarceration in the United States
As Americans ushered in the new millennium, they also reached
the two million mark, in terms of the number of people incarcerated
in the United States.1 7 1 With this "achievement," the United States
earned the dubious distinction of having the highest incarceration
rate in the world-five to eight times that of most industrialized
nations.' 72  For the seventy years between 1910 and 1980, the
American prison population grew by approximately 462,000, a
conservative growth rate compared to the more than 816,000 person
increase during the 1990s alone.173 In fact, the number of people
incarcerated in America quadrupled between 1980 and 2000.174
While the population of the United States comprises only five
percent of the entire world population, Americans claim one-fourth
of the globe's prison population.175 America also incarcerates six
times more people than the entire European Union ("EU"), even
though the twelve EU nations possess 100 million more citizens than
the United States. 176 Schiraldi and Ziedenberg charge that "[olur
jails and prisons have literally become the 51st state, with a greater
171. See, e.g., U.S. Imprisoned Population May Hit 2 Million in 2000,
WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2000, at A04, available at LEXIS, News Library, Wash.
Post File, 2000 WL 2277557; Vincent Schiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg, The Real
Y2K Problem-Two Million Prisoners in 2000, Pacific News Service, at
http://www.ncmonline.com/commentary/1999-12-24/prisoners.html (Dec. 24,
1999).
172. Rudolph J. Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 135, 164
(2001). But see GRAY, supra note 5, at 29 (alleging that as recently as 1998,
Russia had a higher incarceration rate than the United States, with 685 of every
100,000 residents imprisoned).
173. Vincent Schiraldi et al., Poor Prescription: The Costs of Imprisoning
Drug Offenders in the United States, Justice Policy Institute 2 (July 2000), at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/downloads/pp.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
174. Editorial, Too Many Behind Bars, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2001, at A14,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Wash. Post File, 2001 WL 23188144; see
also Gerber, supra note 174, at 164 (noting that the national prison population
quintupled since 1973 and increased six fold since 1970); GRAY, supra note 5,
at 29 (recounting that the national number of prisoners doubled between 1973
and 1983; that it more than doubled again between 1983 and 1993; and that 1.8
million people were imprisoned in the United States by the end of 1998).
175. Schiraldi et al., supra note 175, at 3.
176. Schiraldi & Ziedenberg, supra note 173; Schiraldi et al., supra note
175, at 6; see also Roy Walmsley, Research and Findings: World Prison
Population List, Home Office, at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/
r88.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2003) (comparing incarceration across the world).
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combined population than Alaska, North Dakota and South
Dakota."'
77
While this imprisonment explosion alone is alarming, the
contribution of U.S. drug policies to this dramatic rise is equally as
troubling. 178 From 1980 to 1997, nationwide drug arrests tripled.'
79
The FBI has even reported that drug offenses accounted for more
than one million of its arrests in 1991.180 Moreover, only six percent
of state prisoners and twenty-five percent of federal prisoners were
drug offenders in 1980.181 By 1999, however, the state prison
population included twenty-one percent drug offenders, an increase
of twelve times. 18 2 The federal drug offender population also spiked
to more than double its numbers in 1980.183 Of prisoners
nationwide, the United States now has 100,000 more people
incarcerated for drug offenses than the EU has imprisoned for all
offenses combined.'84
As compared to the two million U.S. prisoners in 2000, England
has 73,802 people incarcerated in the year 2003.185 This number
grew from the average imprisoned population of 64,600 in 2000 and
marked the highest incarcerated population in England and Wales
177. Schirladi & Ziedenberg, supra note 173.
178. See, e.g., The Role of Violent Crime in US. Incarceration Rates,
Human Rights Watch (discussing how changes in public policy rather than
increased rate of violent crime affects incarceration rates), at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/Rcedrg00-02.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2003).
179. Drug Policy and the Criminal Justice System, The Sentencing Project 1
(2001), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/5047.pdf (last
updated August 2001) [hereinafter Drug Policy and the Criminal Justice
System]. In 1999, four out of five drug arrests were for simple possession, with
the remainder for drug sales or trafficking. Id.
180. GRAY, supra note 5, at 30.
181. Drug Policy and the Criminal Justice System, supra note 181, at 1.
182. Id.
183. Id.; see also GRAY, supra note 5, at 30 (writing that drug offenders
comprised fifty-eight percent of all federal prisoners near the end of 1998).
184. Schiraldi et al., supra note 175, at 6 (alleging that America has 458,131
people behind bars for drug crimes, while the EU has imprisoned 356,626 for
drug and non-drug offenses).
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ever, next to the 65,300 population in 1998.186 While quite low
compared to the United States, the English incarceration rate marked
the second highest in Europe next to Portugal in 2000.187 Of the
approximately 64,600 people imprisoned in England in the year
2000, fifteen percent were imprisoned on drug offenses as compared
to more than thirty percent incarcerated for sexual offenses and
violent crimes combined.
18 8
Part of the incarceration escalation in the United States stems
from drug policies that target people who commit non-violent
offenses. In fact, "[tiwo-thirds of the inmates in America's prisons
and jails-over 1.2 million prisoners-are locked up for non-violent
offenses[,]" according to Schiraldi and Ziedenberg. 8 9 While the
number of violent offenders doubled from 1980 to 1999,190 the
number of non-violent prisoners has tripled, 191 and the number of
drug prisoners has increased seven-fold. 192  Accordingly, almost
twenty-five percent of American prisoners are serving time for a
non-violent drug offense. 1
93
The comparative incarceration rates in the United States and
England draw out numerous harmful consequences of the emphasis
on incarceration in the United States. As mentioned, the violent
prisoner population doubled in the same timeframe that the drug
offender population increased by seven times. 194 United States drug
sentencing laws have focused on incarceration as the primary
186. Prison Statistics: England and Wales 2000, Home Office 1 [hereinafter
Prison Statistics: England and Wales 2000] (presented to Parliament by the
Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty
August 2001), at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/prisstat2krev.pdf
(last visited Oct. 8, 2003) ; Mike Elkins & Jide Olagundoye, The Prison
Population in 2000: A Statistical Review, Home Office 1, at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/rl 54.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
187. Prison Statistics: England and Wales 2000, supra note 188, at 1.
188. Elkins & Olagundoye, supra note 188, at 2 tbl. 1 (showing 22%
incarceration for violent crimes and 10% for sexual offenses).
189. Schiraldi & Ziedenberg, supra note 173.
190. GRAY, supra note 5, at 29.
191. Schiraldi & Ziedenberg, supra note 173.
192. Id.; see GRAY, supra note 5, at 29; see also Schiraldi et al., supra note
175, at 3 ("Fully 76% of the increase in admissions to America's prisons from
1978 to 1996 was attributable to non-violent offenders, much of that to persons
incarcerated for drug offenses.").
193. Schiraldi et al., supra note 175, at 6.
194. See supra note 194.
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solution to the drug problem. Rather than prioritizing the
incapacitation of violent criminals, U.S. drug sentencing laws
continue to incarcerate non-violent drug offenders at a higher rate
and to the exclusion of violent offenders.
Even worse, U.S. legislation results in jailing these non-violent
offenders alongside seriously dangerous criminals, increasing the
chance that these inmates will become more violent while
incarcerated, and thus, possibly transforming them from non-violent
offenders before incarceration into potentially violent offenders upon
release.' 95 By imprisoning non-violent drug offenders for longer
terms than violent offenders, and simultaneously contaminating the
non-violent drug offender population with convicted violent felons,
U.S. drug sentencing laws essentially privilege violence by punishing
it less severely than drug violations and risk engendering violent
behavior.
This result has both emblematic and pragmatic consequences.
In a symbolic sense, the scheme conveys the message that criminal
violence is "preferable" to, or more acceptable than, criminal drug
activity. The public may interpret this outcome to suggest that
selling, possessing, or using illicit substances imparts worse social
harm than violent crimes with shorter statutorily mandated prison
terms. Moreover, overcrowded prisons have forced U.S.
penitentiaries nationwide to forego rehabilitation programs because
officials must deal with the burdensome task of accommodating too
many inmates. 196 This overcapacity, combined with cutbacks in
195. See Too Many Behind Bars, supra note 176; Gerber, supra note 174, at
167. Incarcerating drug users with other inmates also may exacerbate the drug
addiction problem among prisoners. See Vincent Schiraldi et al., America's
One Million Non- Violent Prisoners, at http://www.cjcj.org/pubs/onemillion/
onemillionpr.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2003); see also Steven Belenko, Behind
Bars: Substance Abuse and America 's Prison Population, National Center on
Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University (CASA) (Jan. 1998)
(reporting that 80% of incarcerated Americans abuse drugs and alcohol), at
http://209.208.151.183:8080/pdshopprov/files/5745.pdf (last visited Oct. 8,
2003).
196. See Prisoners in 2000, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that federal prisons
were at 131% capacity in 2000, while states prisons had 100% capacity in the
same year); John T. Curtin, A Judge's View, 68 Soc. REs. 869, 871 (2001);
Too Many Behind Bars, supra note 176. The federal "Truth-in-Sentencing"
grant program requires states to ensure that both serious drug offenders and
violent criminals serve eighty-five percent of the state sentence imposed. 42
U.S.C. § 13704(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2003). Because other federal legislation
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funding, education, counseling, and occupational programs, ensures
that an increased number of non-violent drug offenders will face few
productive options upon release, 197 all the while having been exposed
to seriously dangerous criminal offenders while incarcerated. 198
In contrast, discretionary drug sentencing in England takes drug
offenses seriously without privileging violent behavior or facilitating
learned violence during incarceration. In 2000, drug offenders
comprised fifteen percent of the prison population, while double that
percentage included defendants who committed a violent crime
against a person or a sexual offense.' 99  Of drug offenders
imprisoned in England, the smallest definable group included those
convicted of simple possession, while drug traffickers, suppliers, and
those who possessed drugs intending to supply them made up the
bulk of incarcerated drug offenders. 20 0 Thus, the British sentencing
scheme results in a proportionately higher imprisonment ratio of
violent offenders as compared to those who commit drug offenses.
In this way, the British system does not privilege violence by
punishing it less severely than drug crimes but still regards drug
violations as serious offenses requiring incarceration.
B. Disproportionate Impact on Non- White And Ethnic
Drug Offenders
In addition to the extraordinary increased rate of incarceration,
existing drug sentencing legislation in the United States raises
serious questions about fairness and racial bias. People of color have
borne the brunt of federal drug-related legislation, comprising
disproportionate numbers of people imprisoned for drug offenses in
abolished parole, however, federal drug offenders must serve their entire
prison terms. See supra note 50. These requirements may encourage states to
parole violent drug-offenders once they have served eighty-five percent of
their prison sentences to make room for offenders convicted under federal drug
laws but serving sentences in state prison.
197. See Curtin, supra note 198, at 871; Too Many Behind Bars, supra note
176.
198. Too Many Behind Bars, supra note 176 ("[H]arsh conditions in prison
may produce individuals more prone to violence than they were before
incarceration. This is especially true of people locked up under mandatory
drug-sentencing laws who were not violent in the first place.").
199. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
200. Prison Statistics: England and Wales 2000, supra note 188, at 10 tbl.
l(d).
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America. In fact, one survey conducted by the U.S. Department of
Justice indicates that one-third of black boys born today likely will
spend at least some part. of their lives behind bars,20 1 while other
sources conclude that nearly one-tenth of black males in their
twenties already live in prison,20 2 and almost one out of three black
males currently remains under criminal justice control. 203  Most
troubling, before mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines,
discretionary sentencing resulted in prison terms averaging about
eleven percent longer for blacks as compared to whites who
committed the same offense.204  Today, blacks face forty-nine
percent longer sentences than whites.
20 5
The statistics make plain the lopsided effect that federal drug
sentencing policies have had on people of color.20 6 First, non-whites
comprise a disproportionate number of those imprisoned -when
compared to their actual rates of drug use. While whites, blacks, and
people of Hispanic descent share similar rates of current illicit drug
201. Thomas P. Bonczar & Allen J. Beck, Lifetime Likelihood of Going to
State or Federal Prison, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Mar. 1997), at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/llgsfp.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2003);
Schirladi & Ziedenberg, supra note 173. Thirty-two percent of young black
men ages twenty to twenty-nine were under criminal justice control in 1995.
Young Black Americans and the Criminal Justice System: Five Years Later,
The Sentencing Project (Apr. 2001) (contending that one in four young black
men was under criminal justice control in 1990, and one-third by 1995),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/9070smy.pdf (last visited
Oct. 8, 2003).
202. See Too Many Behind Bars, supra note 176.
203. See Small, supra note 7, at 897 (including prison, jail, probation, or
parole as elements of criminal justice control).
204. Jackie Jadmak, Racial Side of Drugs Recounted, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
June 2, 2001, at E3, available at LEXIS, News Library, Albuquerque File,
2001 WL 22557818.
.205. Id.
206. VI. Racially Disproportionate Incarceration of Drug Offenders, Human
Rights Watch (2000) ("Blacks are incarcerated on drug charges at dramatically
higher rates than whites and drug offenses also account for a much greater
proportion of blacks sent to prison than they do for whites."), at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/RcedrgO0-04.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2003). For reasons why the "war on drugs" has severely impacted black
Americans, see Drug Policy and the Criminal Justice System, supra note 181,
at 4. Small blames the 100-1 crack-cocaine sentencing disparity for the
disproportionate impact on blacks, calling crack sentencing "the modem
equivalent of Jim Crow laws that reinforced postslavery discrimination."
Small, supra note 7, at 899.
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use,20 7 their incarceration rates vary drastically. At the end of 2000,
blacks accounted for forty-six percent of federal prisoners, while
Hispanics totaled sixteen percent, even though each group makes up
only twelve percent of the overall population in the United States.20 8
In the same year, federal and state prisons contained 471,000 white
prisoners as compared to 610,300 blacks and 216,900 Hispanics,
2 °9
despite nearly identical drug use among all three groups and
notwithstanding the fact that whites comprise seventy-five percent of
the nation's population.
210
In addition, people of color are incarcerated for drug offenses
much more often than whites, and the drug offender population
includes many more racial and ethnic minorities than whites.
211
According to Talvi, "[n]ationwide, there are 13 blacks in prison per
one white for drug offenses." 212  A 1999 U.S. Bureau of Justice
Statistics Special Report indicates that between 1984 and 1999,
Hispanics comprised half of those charged with drug offenses, while
207. Summary of Findings from the 2000 National Household Survey on
Drug Abuse, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 21
(Sep. 2001) [hereinafter 2000 National Household Survey] (stating that 6.4%
of whites, 5.3% of Hispanics, and 6.4% of blacks qualified as current illicit
drug users in 2000), at http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/NHSDA/2kNHSDA.pdf
(last visited Oct. 8, 2003); see Who Are America's Drug Users?, Frontline
Drug Wars (2000) [hereinafter Who Are America's Drug Users?] (including
slightly different statistical breakdown of 7.7% of blacks currently using
drugs as compared to 6.8% of Hispanics, and 6.6% of whites), at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/buyers/whoare.html
(last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
208. Prisoners in 2000, supra note 7, at 10 ybl. 14 (detailing prisoners under
state or federal jurisdiction by gender, race, Hispanic origin, and age in 2000);
Profiles of General Demographic Characteristics, supra note 97, at 1
(indicating that blacks Americans comprise 12.3% of the population, while
Hispanics account for 12.5%).
209. See Prisoners in 2000, supra note 7, at 10 tbl. 14 (detailing number of
sentenced prisoners under state or federal jurisdiction by gender, race,
Hispanic origin, and age in 2000); see also Race and Incarceration
in the United States, Human Rights Watch (Feb. 27, 2002), at
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/race/ (issued Feb. 27, 2002).
210. Profiles of General Demographic Characteristics, supra note 97, at 1.
211. VI. Racially Disproportionate Incarceration of Drug Offenders, supra
note 208.
212. Silja J.A. Talvi, Ready, Aim Imprison: New Report on Drug War
Highlights Disproportionate Incarceration of Black Men, WASH. FREE PRESS
(Nov. 2000), at http://www.washingtonfreepress.org/48/ready.html (last visited
Oct. 8, 2003).
1023
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:979
blacks made up nearly thirty percent, and whites only one-quarter,
2 13
even though blacks and Hispanics have a combined total of only
twenty-five percent of the general population.21 4
Arrest and incarceration rates for drug offenses by race also
provide insight. In 1996, "[t]he overall rate of admission to prison
for drug offenses was 63 per 100,000.,,215 Of those arrested, only
twenty people in every group of 100,000 whites faced prison time for
drug violations, while blacks were imprisoned at fourteen times that
rate; 279 of each 100,000 blacks arrested ended up incarcerated.2 16
As expected, the dawn of mandatory minimums and sentencing
guidelines increased the incarceration rate for all groups of drug
offenders. Before drug sentencing reform in the 1980s, nine whites
of every 100,000 were imprisoned for drug violations.217 While this
rate increased by 115% from 1986 to 1996 to twenty whites of every
100,000, black incarceration rates for the same time period
skyrocketed by a non-comparable figure of 465%.218
Not surprisingly, the crack-cocaine disparity in sentencing has
facilitated the disproportionate imprisonment of black Americans. In
1997, blacks in fact comprised eighty-six percent of all federal drug
offenders incarcerated for crack violations.2 19 Whites made up only
five percent.220 David Cole argues that in spite of a U.S. Sentencing
Commission Report issued in 1995 urging Congress to revise crack-
cocaine sentencing disparities because of "the racial disparities and
their corrosive effect on criminal justice generally,' '221 the vast
difference between incarceration rates for white drug offenders as
compared to non-whites persists.
222
Looking comparatively, drug sentencing in England also results
in lopsided imprisonment of people of color. Nineteen percent of the
213. John Scalia, Special Report: Federal Drug Offenders, 1999 with Trends
1984-99, Bureau of Justice Statistics 5 (Aug. 2001), at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fdo99.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
214. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
215. Schiraldi et al., supra note 175, at 11.
216. Id. at 11.
217. Id. at 11-12.
218. Id.
219. Scalia, supra note 215, at 11.
220. Id.
221. COLE, supra note 10, at 143; see also, supra note 64 and accompanying
text.
222. COLE, supra note 10, at 141-46.
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total male prison population and twenty-five percent of the female
prison inhabitants in Britain include racial and ethnic minorities,
even though non-white males and females each represent only about
eight percent of the total population in England. 223 Similarly to the
United States, disproportionate numbers of those imprisoned on drug
offenses include people of color. In fact, one-quarter of black men
incarcerated in England are serving time for a drug violation, as
compared to thirteen percent of white males.224 Of the entire drug
offender population, blacks make up twenty-eight percent, Asians
twenty-three percent, and whites just thirteen.225 Finally, blacks in
England also are more likely to serve longer prison terms than whites
and Asians.
226
This data demonstrates that the drug sentencing schemes in both
the United States and England have created disproportionate
incarceration of racial and ethnic minorities as compared to their
overall proportion of the population in each country. As stated at the
outset of this project, however, the most appropriate solution does
not inhere in any one system. The problems with discretionary
sentencing in England and fixed mandatory minimums and
sentencing guidelines that penalize crack as compared to other drugs
in the United States illustrate that a similar racial unfairness exists
attendant to each approach.
While both the U.S. and English accounts evidence the troubling
burden that each sentencing scheme inflicts on non-whites, the
comparison still proves useful. Most obviously, the troubling
statistics from both countries demonstrate the critical nature of this
problem. The data should compel conscientious lawmakers in both
England and the United States to appreciate the urgent need for some
kind of reform. British and U.S. policymakers should concern
themselves with this racially unbalanced result because of their
commitment to non-discrimination, to ensure the credibility of the
223. Elkins & Olagundoye, supra note 188, at 3. This number includes
foreign nationals. See Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System: A
Home Office Publication Under Section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act of
1991, Home Office [hereinafter A Home Office Publication], at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/s95race00.pdf (last visited Oct. 8,
2003).
224. Elkins & Olagundoye, supra note 188, at 3.
225. A Home Office Publication, supra note 225, at 41.
226. Id.
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drug control laws and sentencing schemes in each nation, and
because of the collateral consequences that will result from such high
imprisonment of non-whites.
227
The English system also points out the flaws that accompany a
228discretionary system.2. Racial bias among judges who possess great
flexibility in sentencing for drug offenses hasresulted in a situation
similar to the problem in the United States before Congress instituted
229mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines. By adopting a
fixed sentencing system, in 1986, American lawmakers
communicated in part that they understood the unequal impact that
unrestrained judicial discretion could have on people of color. They
adopted a new system, designed to some extent to accommodate for
racial bias among judges, to ameliorate the disproportionate
incarceration and sentence lengths borne by racial and ethnic
minorities, and to reach a fair outcome. 23  That the same problem
with judicial discretion persists in England today suggests that
reversion to a totally discretionary system in the United States would
likely result in the very problem that Congress expected mandatory
minimums and sentencing guidelines to address.
While England confirms the difficulties that American legal
scholars and policymakers already knew were associated with
discretionary sentencing, the U.S. system suggests that mandatory
minimum legislation and sentencing guidelines may not result in
such racially disparate results in every case. For example, if the drug
sentencing laws in the United States did not impose a special burden
on crack as compared to all other controlled substances, at least part
of the unbalanced numbers of blacks incarcerated in American
prisons nationwide would not exist. Since eighty-six percent of all
people incarcerated in the United States for federal crack offenses are
black,231 and mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines require
longer prison terms for smaller amounts of crack than any other
227. COLE, supra note 10, at 146 (warning that "[t]he short-term 'benefits'
of removing offenders from the community may well come back to haunt us in
the long term").
228. See, e.g., ROGER HOOD, RACE AND SENTENCING (1992) (in
collaboration with Graca Cordovil).
229. See, e.g., supra notes 52-53, 207 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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illicit drug,232 the crack-cocaine sentencing disparity causes at least
some of the racially disproportionate incarceration rates.
The most troubling lesson learned, however, is that attempts to
revise a discretionary system very similar to the existing scheme in
England, in order to ameliorate racial bias in the United States, have
resulted in more alarming racial disparities than existed before fixed
sentences. We should consider that black offenders prosecuted for
crack violations might have a better chance of being treated fairly-
as compared to all other drug offenders-in a discretionary system
that previous experience has shown elicits racial bias. At least such a
scheme would allow some conscientious and well-informed judges to
consider the disproportionate incarceration rates affecting people of
color in the United States and the unfairness of the crack-cocaine
disparity.
In both systems, people of color may suffer what Jody Armour
terms the "Black Tax," or "the price Black people pay in their
encounters with Whites (and some Blacks) because of Black
,,233stereotypes. Under discretionary drug sentencing laws in
England, non-whites may face conscious discrimination before
judges who believe that non-white drug offenders pose.a greater
danger than whites.234 More likely, magistrates and Crown Court
judges harbor unconscious discrimination, which "resides in the
inner recesses of the human psyche,, 235 resulting in imprisonment of
racial and ethnic minorities more often and for longer prison terms
than white offenders who commit the same crimes. In the United
States, at least some members of Congress likely thought that crimes
involving crack risked greater harm to society than those involving
heroin or powder cocaine when they enacted mandatory minimums
and sentencing guidelines. 236 The press may have helped create or
exacerbate this unconscious bias among lawmakers, who already
may have associated racial minorities with crime,2 37 by linking crack
abuse and black Americans.238 Where such bias operated, mandatory
232. See supra notes 62-64, 78-80 and accompanying text.
233. JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13 (1997).
234. Id. at 16.
235. Id. at 17.
236. See supra notes 62-64, 78-80 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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minimums and sentencing legislation codified a version of the Black
Tax that should urge U.S. lawmakers to reform existing drug
sentencing legislation.
Perhaps the most illuminating lesson gleaned from comparing
the racialized consequences of the sentencing systems in both the
United States and England is that the juxtaposition of fixed
sentencing in the United States and discretionary sentencing in
England as minimizing or contributing to a disproportionate impact
on people of color does not hold true. The debate about
discretionary and fixed sentencing has emphasized the racially biased
results inherent in a system that relies on judicial discretion, while
extolling the potential virtue of a system that attempts to streamline
sentences for similar offenders who commit similar crimes through
mandatory minimums. This comparison at least suggests that we
should begin to look at other inputs into the sentencing equation in
evaluating the racially lopsided results that drug sentencing schemes
have had on people of color in both the United States and England.
C. Enduring Drug Abuse
Despite more than a decade of mandatory minimum legislation
and sentencing guidelines, drug dependence and addiction persist in
the United States. In fact, approximately fourteen million
Americans, or more than six percent of the population ages twelve
and older, were classified as current illicit drug users according to the
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse in 2000.239 This number
remained constant from 1999,240 though it increased as compared to
previous years. In 1996, about thirteen million Americans qualified
as current illicit drug users.241 By 1997, this number jumped to
approximately 13.9 million Americans,242 which remained relatively
constant until 1999 when it surpassed fourteen million.
243
239. 2000 National Household Survey, supra note 209, at 1; see Who Are
America's Drug Users, supra note 209.
240. 2000 National Household Survey, supra note 209.
241. Preliminary Results from the 1997 National Household Survey on Drug
Abuse, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
[hereinafter 1997 National Household Survey], at http://www.samhsa.gov/
Press/980821 o.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
242. Id.
243. 2000 National Household Survey, supra note 209.
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The National Household Surveys show that while six percent of
the population qualifying as illicit drug users is too many, today's
category of drug abusers pales compared to the estimated twenty-five
million drug users in 1979.244 True, the Surveys reflect a positive
decline in the approximate number of current illicit drug users. The
Sentencing Project criticizes, however, that drug use rates began to
decline before the mandatory minimum and sentencing guideline
regime.245 Furthermore, since mandatory minimums did not change
between 1996 and 2000, the most recent time period in which the
National Household Survey indicates a remarkable drug use
fluctuation, perhaps drug sentencing has little causal connection to
drug abuse.
246
Even if we assume that strict drug sentencing schemes do impact
drug abuse rates positively, however, and even if we accept that the
drug sentencing reform that began in the 1980s is responsible for this
overall positive trend, the evidence still indicates that drug use
persists, and the category of habitual drug users has either stayed
even or continued in an upward trend in recent years.247
It could be that no matter what sentencing practices legislators
employ, a certain percentage of the population will always use drugs.
Looking comparatively at the rate of drug abuse in England informs
this discussion. The UK Drug Report on Trends in 2001248 shows
244. See 1997 National Household Survey, supra note 243.
245. Drug Policy and the Criminal Justice System, supra note 181, at 2.
246. Congress last amended the mandatory minimum scheme with the Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act in 1994. See supra notes 81-91 and
accompanying text. If rigid drug sentencing statutes have a positive impact on
drug use, then statistics should show a drop in current illicit drug use instead of
a rise. One could argue, on the other hand, that the recent rise in the number of
current illegal drug users could indicate that whatever may have been
contributing to a decline in drug abuse, which could be mandatory minimum
legislation and sentencing guidelines, may have reached its optimal level. This
argument would support an increase in the mandatory minimum sentences
already in place.
247. See supra notes 241-45.
248. The Report is issued by DrugScope, "the UK's leading independent
centre of expertise on drugs" that "provide[s] quality drug information,
promote[s] effective responses to drug taking, undertake[s] research at local,
national and international levels, advise[s] on policy-making, [and]
encourage[s] informed debate... ." Welcome to the DrugScope Website,
DrugScope, at http://www.drugscope.org.uk/about/home.asp (last visited Oct.
8, 2003).
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that monthly users, or the equivalent of current illicit drug users in
the U.S. National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, totaled about
twelve percent of the English population in 2002.249 This number,
much like that in the United States, remained constant from 2001 and
marks an increase from drug use rates of eleven percent in 2000 and
1998, and ten percent in 1996 and 1994.250 With persistent drug
abuse in both countries, the major question becomes whether the
appreciably different drug sentencing schemes used in each country
for the past fifteen years had any impact on the amount of illicit drug
use in each nation.
Certainly, drug sentencing could meet many aims, with reducing
use and abuse of illicit substances as only one of those goals. If
existing drug sentencing laws actually were reducing drug use,
legislators in either country might not feel compelled to give great
weight to indicators demonstrating some amount of continued drug
addiction. Moreover, non-sentencing policies may help both nations
achieve a decline in illicit drug use in the future; these strategies may
be compatible with the existing sentencing scheme in both countries,
allowing lawmakers to leave their respective legislative sentencing
schemes intact. On the other hand, if deterring illicit drug use
comprises one of the principal objectives of the contemporary
sentencing landscape in the United States,25' largely stagnant drug
use rates in the United States suggest that mandatory minimum
249. UK Drug Report 2001, Chapter 2: Epidemiological Situation,
DrugScope, at http://www.drugscope.org.uk/druginfo/drugsearch/ds-report
results.asp?file=\wip\l 1\3\004chapter2.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
250. Id.
251. Mandatory minimum legislation and sentencing guidelines for simple
possession, or possession of drugs for personal use, suggest that at least part of
the emphasis centers on deterring or reducing personal drug use. See supra
notes 58-59, 62-64, 73, 80 and accompanying text. The Sentencing Reform
Act, which created the U.S. Sentencing Commission, directed the Commission
to "insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a
sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the
defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment." 28 U.S.C. § 994 (k)
(1984). Finally, the statute that created the Sentencing Commission listed
various issues the Commission should consider in determining an appropriate
sentence, including "the need for the sentence imposed.., to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (1984). These
legislative provisions suggest that deterrence may be one of the foremost goals
of the current drug sentencing scheme.
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penalties and the sentencing guidelines have done little to affect the
desired change.
Evidence about illicit drug use in both the United States and
England presents a difficult question. Mandatory minimum
legislation and the sentencing guidelines have not reduced illicit drug
use in dramatic or even significant terms in the United States.2 52 The
sentencing laws in England, which place ceilings on sentences,
involve greater judicial discretion, and focus less on incarceration,
also have yielded persistent drug use rates, and rates that hover
around double the rate of illicit drug use in the United States. 53
Without a systematic statistical analysis, it may not be possible to
conclude much of anything about the rates of illicit drug use in either
country. 254 One way we might conceptualize the problem, however,
is to consider whether the important data is that the English suffer
twice as much illicit drug use as the United States, or that both
countries experience a persistent drug abuse problem. England has
endured greater drug abuse among its population than the United
States for many years; that difference may not prove as significant as
the fact that neither England nor the United States has experienced a
perceptible decline in its drug abuse.
This comparison of drug abuse rates does not suggest that the
incidence of drug use shares no relationship to the type of criminal
sentencing scheme utilized. The point this comparison draws out,
however, speaks to the absence of a positive effect of either
sentencing scheme on the amount of illicit drug use in either country.
We can imagine many reasons-other than the types of drug
sentencing laws-that might impact drug use in both societies: the
state of the economy, unemployment, lack of education, mental
illness, boredom, peer pressure, or even recreation. For the sake of
argument, however, persistent drug abuse rates in the United States
and England across markedly different sentencing schemes at least
question whether non-sentencing policies might have a more
considerable bearing on drug abuse than drug sentencing legislation.
If this comparison between U.S. and British drug addiction rates does
suggest that policies other than criminal sentencing have the greatest
252. See supra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text.
254. It could be that the different sentencing system in England yields higher
drug abuse rates than in the United States.
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potential to decrease drug abuse rates, then U.S. policymakers should
not allow a fear of persistent drug use in America to frustrate
necessary sentencing reform.
VI. CONCLUSION
The comparison between drug sentencing legislation in this
piece presents two types of important lessons. First, a basic analysis
of sentencing provisions shows various facial differences between
the drug sentencing laws in the United States and England. British
law affords magistrates and judges who determine sentencing for
drug offenses more discretion than does the U.S. system. English
drug sentencing laws restrain magistrates and judges only with
maximum sentences, rather than requiring mandatory minimum
incarceration terms for similar offenses as in the United States.
Finally, the English drug sentencing scheme categorizes all drugs
based on their perceived dangerousness for the purpose of
determining the appropriate sentence, leaving magistrates and judges
with discretion to weigh the amount of the drug in question and
many other factors in determining a sentence. The U.S. sentencing
scheme, in contrast, trusts judges much less to make the appropriate
sentencing decision, allowing them to consider only the amount and
type of drug involved in the offense, and in some cases, the
defendant's criminal history. Drug sentencing laws in the United
States also penalize crack offenders more harshly with respect to the
quantity of the drug required to trigger mandatory minimums than
offenders committing crimes involving any other drug.
Beyond the facial differences between the two systems, a
comparison between the consequences of the drug sentencing system
in each country advances the analysis. Rigid mandatory minimums
and sentencing guidelines have resulted in U.S. incarceration rates
higher than any nation in the world. Though England imprisons
more people than most nations in Europe, the number of people
incarcerated for drug offenses cannot compare to the many thousands
serving time in America. This difference helps us to see that a fixed
sentencing system for drug offenses, but not for violent offenses,
consequently privileges violence as compared to drug offenses. This
outcome communicates a dangerous message and also may expose
the public to increased harm by imprisoning violent offenders for
shorter terms than non-violent drug offenders, affording non-violent
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drug offenders the opportunity to learn from and adopt the behavior
of incarcerated violent offenders.
Comparing the consequences of the two different drug
sentencing systems illustrates a disproportionate impact on people of
color who commit drug offenses. The racial disparity among
convicted drug offenders indicates that non-whites comprise
disproportionate numbers of imprisoned drug offenders in both
Britain and the United States. This consequence suggests that
neither the discretionary drug sentencing legislation in England nor
the pre-determined penalties in the United States achieves an
acceptable outcome. Largely unbridled discretion in England and set
sentences for non-violent drug offenders, as well as the crack-
cocaine disparity in the United States, result in alarming racial
disparities-a version of Armour's "Black Tax." Critically
evaluating the flaws in each system helps us to see how both systems
contribute to this tax. Moreover, this comparison suggests that the
discussion about the disproportionate impact that the drug war has
had on non-whites may be too narrowly focused on the polarization
between discretionary sentencing and non-discretionary sentencing.
In other words, the comparison between mandatory minimums in the
United States and a less rigid system in England demonstrates that
other considerations, in addition to the rigidity or flexibility of a
sentencing scheme, matter to the impact that sentencing legislation
will have on people of color.
Enduring drug abuse rates among English and U.S. populations
intimate that edging away from the unyielding drug sentencing
system in the United States to reduce overwhelming imprisonment,
ceasing to privilege violent offenders as compared to non-violent
drug offenders, and tackling the troubling racial disparities in
incarceration may not result in increased drug use and addiction.
With markedly more flexible sentencing laws, England suffers
similarly constant rates of drug abuse as compared to the United
States. Congress should explore the possibility that sentencing laws
may have less of an impact on drug use than non-sentencing
programs, such as education, alternative sentencing schemes, and
limited decriminalization of less dangerous controlled substances.
This piece has not developed a concrete initiative for legislative
reform. At worst, it has illustrated some of the disconcerting
problems evident in the existing U.S. drug sentencing scheme from a
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new perspective, and has shown some similar problems also inhere
in a markedly different sentencing system. This paper makes a
strong case for the urgency of drug sentencing reform, by illustrating
(1) the distressing level of incarceration attendant to the U.S.
sentencing scheme that is notably absent in England; and (2) the
related privileging of violent criminals, as compared to non-violent
drug offenders. We should heed these differences from the English
system, a, country that we consider an equal, a partner, and a nation
similarly committed to democratic ideals, with great seriousness.
Beyond situating the problems associated with drug sentencing
legislation in a new context, this comparative project also
recommends a departure from the crack-cocaine disparity in U.S.
mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines. While some
version of non-discretionary sentencing legislation may guard
against racial disparities in sentencing, the provisions that penalize
violations involving much smaller amounts of crack as compared to
the same amount of other illicit drugs have exacerbated the
disproportionately long sentences already inflicted on racial and
ethnic minorities before federal drug sentencing reform. U.S.
lawmakers who consider certain drugs more harmful than others
could still fashion different fixed or discretionary sentences based on
dangerousness categorizations, similar to British law, rather than
targeting crack offenses as compared to crimes involving all other
drugs.
Excepting the crack-cocaine disparity, U.S. legislators might
consider adjusting mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines
to result in less drastic levels of incarceration. One appropriate
amendment might reduce the mandatory minimum sentences from
their current lengths or eliminate them altogether for non-violent
drug offenders. Congress might take a cautious approach,
commissioning a study that examines the incarceration crisis, the
contribution of mandatory minimum sentences to this problem, and
the ways in which this system treats violent offenders differently by
subjecting them to less prison time than many non-violent drug
offenders. Following this investigation, Congress might institute a
reduction in sentence lengths for non-violent offenders convicted of
drug possession.
Largely unregulated discretion in the English system results in
racially disparate incarceration rates and sentence lengths,
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undercutting the arguments of those seeking wholesale abandonment
of the fixed sentencing scheme currently in place in the United
States. Because the English system has resulted in racially lopsided
sentencing results, however, does not mean that every sentencing
scheme incorporating judicial discretion would fail to treat the drug
problem seriously, deter repeat offenders, prevent initiation of drug
use, protect the public, and achieve racially balanced consequences.
A discretionary scheme that caps prison terms could provide judges
with discretion to choose an appropriate sentence length and provide
detailed guidelines for determining the appropriate sentence.
Beyond raising specific and very pragmatic lessons, looking
comparatively at English drug sentencing laws also helps us to think
seriously about what normative values we have incorporated into our
federal drug sentencing laws and what other principles we care about
but that remain noticeably absent from drug sentencing legislation.
As mentioned, two important value-laden consequences of the
current system include a benefiting or privileging of violent offenses
as compared to all drug offenses, including non-violent drug crimes,
and a disproportionate burdening of people of color as casualties in
the drug war. Certainly, our aim, in constructing a sentencing
scheme lies with addressing the serious criminal harm associated
with drug crimes, a result we hope to reach without punishing violent
crimes less harshly, or unfairly singling out any particular racial or
ethnic group in the process.
By understanding the unfortunate and unintended consequences
of our federal drug sentencing system, we begin to see the normative
underpinnings that we want a drug sentencing scheme to uphold:
one that punishes violent offenders, who pose the greatest risk of
continued and serious harm to society, more severely than those who
pose a less severe risk of harm as non-violent drug offenders; one
that avoids brutalizing non-violent drug offenders, who are
imprisoned for lengthy sentences alongside violent offenders; one
that moves toward less racially biased results so that those arrested,
prosecuted, and incarcerated for drug crimes do not include grossly
disproportionate numbers of people of color; one that takes seriously
the astonishing incarceration rates in the United States as compared
to the rest of the world community; and one that takes the drug
problem seriously and deals with it effectively. In addition, we seek
an overall drug strategy that, perhaps independent from a sentencing
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scheme, begins to decrease appreciably the persistent use of illegal
drugs.
This piece only scratches the surface of a comparative
consequentialist exercise in the area of drug sentencing. England
provides one helpful example for examining the particular contours
of drug sentencing legislation, substantial incarceration, and racially
disparate imprisonment rates for drug offenses. Other legal systems
may provide helpful insight into these consequences and many
others. Moreover, future comparative papers might move beyond
sentencing to explore another area of the American "drug war" or
drug policies, investigating comparative consequences appropriate to
that subject, such as effective, non-sentencing methods of decreasing
illicit drug use.
Drug sentencing encompasses a breadth of areas in need of
reform. From a practical standpoint, legislators might find it
politically easiest to explore one aspect of the federal drug
sentencing law or one particularly upsetting consequence with great
enthusiasm. For example, lawmakers might first decide to revisit the
crack-cocaine sentencing disparity, or strict mandatory minimums
for non-violent drug offenders. They may, alternatively, set out to
attack prison overcrowding and its relationship to federal drug
sentencing legislation, or the ways in which the current system
privileges violent offenders as compared to non-violent drug
offenders. Most importantly, however, scholars and legislators
should continue to engage in discussion about "drug war" dilemmas
on the road toward reform, giving particular attention to the
normative values that underlie the current sentencing choices we
have made and the consequent practical results. Looking
comparatively at foreign jurisdictions provides one helpful and novel
way to frame this dialogue.
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